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I. Introduction 
Pharmaceuticals is a large, high-growth, globalised, and innovation intensive 
industry.  Its products – drugs – are directed to satisfy consumer needs in an area – 
health care – which is vital for society. Health care and therapeutics are among the 
most relevant issues in the definition of the concepts of welfare and democracy in 
the new Century. Thus, the pharmaceutical industry is clearly a “strategic” sector 
for Europe.  
Ever since the XIX Century, pharmaceuticals has been a stronghold of the 
European industry, and it still provides by far the largest contribution to the 
European trade balance in high-technology, R&D intensive sectors.  
However, it is now a diffused perception that the European pharmaceutical industry 
is losing ground vis-à-vis the United States.  
Against this background, the Report examines the competitive position of the 
European pharmaceutical companies and industries, and compares them with the 
pharmaceutical companies and industries in o h r parts of the world, particularly 
the US.  
Over the last two decades, the industry has experienced some important structural 
changes, mainly driven by technological and institutional shocks that have affected 
all the stages of its value chain. In turn, this has led to changes in firms’ 
organisation and in market structure, within domestic markets, regionally, and 
globally. 
On the one hand, the life sciences have transformed the prospects and the processes 
of drug discovery and development.  On the other and, the rise of healthcare and 
prescription drug spending has induced cost containment policies, which have 
affected the structure of demand in all the major national markets. In addition, 
increasingly stringent requirements for the approval of new drugs, together with the 
orientation of research towards increasingly complex pathologies, have implied 
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larger, more costly and internationally based clinical trials.  Developments in 
legislation and in courts’ interpretation of issues concerning intellectual prop rty 
rights, as well as the increasing openness of domestic markets to foreign 
competition, have influenced patterns of industrial competition and the evolution of 
industry structure.   
Jointly, these tendencies have implied a sharp increase in the sources needed to 
develop new drugs. Equally important, they have led to a redefinition of the nature 
and the complementarities between the fundamental sources of competitive 
advantages in this industry, namely R&D and innovative competencies, marketing 
and distribution capabilities.  
The pharmaceutical industry today has to be understood as a system or network. 
Innovative activities, as welll as production and commercialisation of drugs, rest on 
and involve, either directly or indirectly, a large variety of actors: different types of 
firms, other research organisations like universities and public and private research 
centers, financial institutions, regulatory authorities, governments, health care 
systems, consumers, physicians, etc. These actors are linked tog ther through a 
web of different relationships, which include almost pure market transactions, 
“command and control” administrative rules, competition, collaboration, and all 
sorts of “intermediate forms”.  
This suggests that the competitiveness of the industry cannot be assessed by 
looking only at the individual firms, but also at the broader set of institutions, 
infrastructures, and policies that influence the actions of companies, and – eve  
more important – at the dynamic interactions between thes  levels of analysis.  
The picture is further complicated by the fact that the industry is populated by very 
different firms.  In the first place, there are the multinational companies, which 
cover between 40 to 60% of most national markets in the advanced countries.  
These are fairly global firms.  Although they do keep a good share of activities and 
sales in their own domestic, or at least continental markets, these companies 
operate across national or even continental borders, and they set divisions and 
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activities in other countries and regions as well.  Often, their property is spread 
across different countries, particularly Europe and the US.  These are highly R&D-
intensive companies with large sunk costs both in R&D and in marketing and 
distribution assets.
1
 
The industry is populated by two other types of firms.  First, there are smaller 
companies which are specialised in the sales of non R&D-inte sive drugs.  They 
conduct mainly manufacturing and commercialisation activities, and do not invest 
in R&D.  These are typically national companies which operate almost exclusively 
in their own markets.  Since the past twenty years or so, another set of companies 
have populated this industry, notably the research intensive companies that have 
sprung off from the new opportunities opened up by the life sciences – th  so-
called New Biotechnology Firms (NBFs).  These companies are specialised in the 
new biotechnologies, and their activities range from the discovery and 
development of new drug compounds to the development of new drug screening or 
research tools and technologies in fields like genomics, bioinformatics, etc.  
Measuring competitiveness is always a difficult exercise, given the ambiguity with 
which this concept is sometimes used and the different possibl  inter retation that 
can be found in the literature. As a consequence, and given the complexity of the 
pharmaceutical industry in its relationships with the research, regulatory and 
healthcare systems, we introduce here a set of differentiated indicators, including 
various measures of value added, productivity, trade balance, world market shares 
and, above all, innovativeness. Jointly, these measures provide a fairly coherent 
and consistent indication about the dynamics of competitiveness and its 
determinants.  
                                            
1
Manufacturing is not that important in this industry compared to R&D and commercialisation, which 
command the bulk of the investments. 
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The main finding of the Report is that indeed the European industry has been 
losing competitiveness as compared to the USA, although there are large 
differences and trends across European countries. As a whole, Europe is lagging 
behind in its ability to generate, organise, and sustain innovation processes that are 
increasingly expensive and organisationally complex. More specifically, the main 
results of the Report can be summarised as follows.
A. First, using Eurostat data we document that the European pha maceutical 
industry is more labour intensive than the US or the Japanese industries. We find 
that the share of labour costs on the value of production in Europe is higher than in 
the US and Japan. The difference is sufficiently high to suggest thatit cannot just 
stem from higher charges on labour costs in Europe. Moreover, the share of value 
added net of labour costs on total production value is much higher for the US and 
Japan.  The US and Japanese industries rely more than Europe on "non-labour" 
inputs, such as capital or most likely R&D. The overall share of total value added 
on production value in the US and Japan is also higher than in Europe. 
All these factors combined suggest that not only is the European industry labour 
intensive, but that the higher labour intensity is also associated with lower value 
added activities. While there are differences across European countries, our results 
are not inconsistent with the view that in the European pharmaceutical industry 
there is a less pronounced specialisation in R&D activities, and that there is a larger 
presence of non R&D-intensive firms which conduct fairly mundane activities. 
We also find that while the European industry grew faster than the US and Japan in 
the 1980s, in the 1990s it has grown less than the US industry. This stems from a 
deceleration of the growth of the industry in Europe, and an acceleration of the US 
industry growth.  We also employ traditional growth accounting techniques to 
Eurostat country level data to decompose the growth of the industry in the US, 
Japan, and the EU-15 countries. While employment growth has practically no 
contribution to the growth of production value in pharmaceuticals, we find that in 
the US (and Japan) the growth of the industry stems to a good extent from th  
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growth of its non-labour inputs. By contrast, these inputs contribute modestly to the 
growth of the industry in Europe, whose growth is accounted for largely by the 
unexplained residuals – viz. by factors that are independent of the growth of the 
measurable inputs. 
One may be tempted to attribute this result to some form of unobserved 
technological change or externality.  In fact,  most of the technical change in this 
industry comes from specific investments in R&D, which are captured by the non-
labour inputs in the value added figures for the industry.  As a result, our 
interpretation about the weight of the residual in the European drug sector growth 
is that the growth of the industry in Europe is likely to depend to a good extent on 
factors other than R&D, capital or labour.  Not only is this saying that the growth 
of the industry in Europe is more "erratic" than in the US or Japan, but also that the 
growth in capital or R&D translates less markedly into sales growth.  The empirical 
evidences produced in Section V of this Report show that this is not independent of  
the effects of the regulatory regimes on industry structure, with the larger presence, 
in Europe, of firms and activities which are less dependent on internal R&D and 
innovation, and more on external inputs, such as licenses from international 
companies, pricing policies, or peculiarities of the public regulatory and health care 
systems or demand in individual European countries, etc.  
B. Second, the Report focuses on the competitiveness of th  European 
multinational corporations, particularly in comparisons with the US firms.  These 
firms compete largely on new drug products based on substantial R&D 
investments.  An important question is therefore whether the innovation- and 
R&D-based competitiveness of the European multinationals has worsened vis-à-vi  
their US or Japanese competitors. Our data indicate that the sales of major 
innovative products by the US multinationals have increased more significantly 
than those of the European multinationals in the 1990s. When we look at the 
number of the top selling new chemical entities (NCE) developed by the European 
and US firms, we find that the number of NCE developed by companies of either 
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regions is not substantially different. This suggests that the European 
multinationals are facing a comparative disadvantage in selling their new drugs. In 
fact, the US pharmaceutical market has grown from being roughly equal to the 
European market at the beginning of the 1990s to almost twice as much in very 
recent years.  In particular, the restructuring of pharmaceutical demand and of the 
health care system, in the US, has translated into demand growth which has 
benefited mainly the US firms. In fact, in spite of their multinational nature, the 
bulk of the sales of the US and European firms is still in their own markets.  It is 
therefore natural that the US firms have taken greater advantage of the growing 
demand in their own country.  Indeed, we find that in this period the European 
multinationals as well have increased their market share in the US to take 
advantage of this opportunity. However differences in terms of market sizes and 
rates of growth does not rule out that differences in sales growth between European 
and US multinationals depend also on differences in the ability to discover and 
develop new drugs. In particular, we find that: a) in the 1990s US companies have 
gained a clear and growing leadership in terms of the sales generated by the New 
Chemical Entities (NCEs) launched on the market place; b) the portfolio of 
products held by the European multinationals tends to be older than that of the US 
firms. These evidences suggest that there may be some differences in research 
productivity in recent years as well.  
C. Our third conclusion is that the relative position of the US as a locus of 
innovation in pharmaceuticals has increased over the past decade compared to 
Europe. One notable difference between Europe and the US in the 1990s is that 
while the US have continued the development of a new research-intensiv  industry 
in the life sciences, Europe has been unable to complete the process of vertical 
specialisation in the most innovative areas of the drug sector.  Particularly, Europe 
has not really given rise to a full fledged industry of innovation specialist 
companies and technology suppliers like in the US. The US pioneered the rise of a 
new organisation of this industry, based on an effective division of labour between 
smaller and larger companies with different comparative advantages in the 
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“exploration” and “exploitation” of new innovation opportunities.
2
 Since he very 
beginning of the new trend in the early 1980s, Europe has been less effective in 
encouraging the growth of new technology suppliers and innovation specialists.  If 
anything, this is emphasised by the fact that the European drug multinationals have 
increasingly relied on sources of research capabilities and innovation located in the 
US, thereby reinforcing the difficulties in creating a European industry of 
technology suppliers.  Likewise, we shall see in this Report that one important 
development in the industry in recent years has been the growth of new tools for 
drug discovery and testing (combinatorial chemistry techniques, genomics, 
highthroughput screening etc.).  These tools can seriously enhance the efficiency of 
the research process in the industry.   So far, however, the industry of new drug 
research tool producers is largely a US phenomenon.  In principle, the fact that 
Europe has been unable to give rise to a full fledged industry of technology 
suppliers may not be considered as a critical problem for the competitiveness of the 
firms operating in the final markets. Competitiveness in sales depends on different 
factors from competitivenss in innovation.  Moreover, in a globalised industry such 
as pharmaceuticals, companies may not need local technology suppliers, provided 
that the drug producers can tap the new technology sources in other markets. The 
question, however, is whether European drug companies can tap such internaional 
sources of technology.  While this may not be a problem for the largest drug 
multinationals, the ability to do so by the large fringe of companies that operate in 
several European national markets is a totally different story.   There is another, 
probably more important, twist to this issue.  More than being critical for the 
growth of the downstream industry, the presence of a local industry of research-
based firms and technology suppliers is critical because the industry is, by itself, a 
powerful source of growth.  We shall note in the Report that the US biotechnology 
industry has given rise in the past two decades to a large number of new jobs, to at 
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 See March, 1991.  
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least a dozen new world-class drug companies (e.g. Amgen, Chiron, Genzyme, and 
others), along with several new others in the new drug tool technologies (e.g. 
Incyte, Millennium), and it has produced a stream of revenues in the form of 
royalties from licenses or R&D contracts and collaborations.  
D. The fourth conclusion that we want to highlight can be pu very simply.  The 
national European markets, especially in some Countries, are not competitive 
enough.  We show this by using data on the variation in prices and market shares 
after patents expire. In some countries, which rely on administered prices, we find 
that prices and market shares do not vary substantially after patents expires. In 
competitive drug markets, price drops are a typical consequence of patent 
expiration and of entry by generic products, with a significant turnover in terms of 
market shares.  We therefore conclude that there is too little market-based 
competition in the final markets in some of the European countries.  This has 
contributed to nurture inefficient positions within the industry.  
 
All in all, the Report claims that the competitiveness of the European 
pharmaceutical industry is negatively affected by the perstistence of insufficient 
degrees of competition and institutional integration, still centred on domestic and 
fragmented markets and research systems. Four sets of variables are found to be 
relevant as sources of competitiveness and growth in pharmaceuticals: 1) The size 
and the structure of the biomedical education and research systems; 2) Some basic 
institutions governing labour markets for skilled researchers and manager , s well 
as corporate governance and finance; 3) Intellectual property rights and patent law; 
4) The nature and intensity of competition on the final market.  
The Report is organised as follows.  In Sections II, III, and IV, a series of measures 
and indicators of the performance of the industry are developed. In section V we 
show that competition is an important determinant of competitiveness .  In Section 
VI, the Report illustrates the role of some institutional variables. Section VII 
summarises our findings.  
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The data analysed in this Report come from OECD, Eurostat, the European Patent 
Office, IMS Health, and from PHID (PHarmaceutical Industry Database) at the 
University of Siena. The general approach is to combine two relevant perspectives 
in the analysis of competitiveness. On the one hand, the IMS, European Patent 
Office, and PHID data sets sustain a detailed analysis of industry dynamics and 
firm-level strategies, by location of corporate headquarters. On the other hand, the 
OECD and Eurostat data sets how production, trade, and R&D activities by 
country, regardless of the origin of the companies (OECD, Eurostat).  
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II.  Structural Indicators in the EU, USA, and Japan  
Total ependiture on pharmaceuticals represents between 0.7 and 2.2% of GDP 
across OECD countries, with a mean at around 1.2%
3
. Demand for pharmaceuticals 
is highest in the US, Western Europe, and Japan. Prescription drug expenditures 
have grown significantly in the past 15 years (see Tables 1 and 2). First, data show 
the substiantial growth of the US market during the Ninenties.  In particular, from 
1995 to 1999, the US market had the highest percent annual growth rates, coming 
to account for approximately 40 percent of the total world market for ethical 
pharmaceuticals in 1999. Europe’s shar  declined to less than 27 percent, while 
Japan’s share in 1999 was nearly 16 percent. In general, total drug expenditures 
have been driven up by the introduction of new drug therapies, higher third-party 
coverage of drugs, the substitution of higher-priced new drugs for lower-priced-
existing drugs, and, especially in the US, more aggressive marketing by 
manufacturers through direct-to-consumer advertising
4
.  
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 See Jacobzone, 2000; OECD Health Data, 2000.  
4
 GAO, 2000.  
Table 1: 
Size of the Market in Pharmaceuticals, 1995-1999, US$ billion 
Markets 1985 1989 1990 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  
World 79.1 153.3 165.8 280.3 290.8 296.1 304.7 337.2 
Regional Shares % % % % % % % % 
North America 28.1 34.0 32.4 31.2 33.0 35.9 38.1 40.2 
Europe 22.0 31.0 26.5 29.6 30.7 28.8 29.1 26.7 
A/A/A 23.4 30.0 35.1 32.4 29.2 27.5 25.0 26.4 
Latin America 5.6 5.0 5.9 6.8 7.1 7.8 7.7 6.6 
Source: IMS International 
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The pharmaceutical industry is the fifth largest industrial sector in the EU, 
amounting to 3.5 per cent of the total manufacturing production (Eurostat). 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical sector provides a sizable, positive contribution to the 
EU trade balance (16,201 US$ million in 1998). As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, 
the EU as a whole is a net exporter of pharmaceutical products, with a positive 
Table 2:  
Largest Pharmaceutical Markets in the World, US$ million 
1989 1994 1999 Rank 1999 Country 
Rank USD Rank USD Rank USD 
1 USA 1 44789 1 75425 1 130069 
2 Japan 2 30229 2 52568 2 53548 
3 Germany 3 9984 4 16725 3 18500 
4 France 4 9326 3 15152 4 17751 
5 Italy 5 8260 5 8829 5 11332 
6 UK 6 4526 6 6821 6 11029 
7 Spain 8 3349 8 4710 7 6596 
17 Belgium 13 1219 15 2162 17 2703 
32 Russia NA NA NA NA 32 1033 
18 Netherlands * 15 1087 16 2078 18 2391 
19 Poland NA NA 27 1010 19 2260 
20 Sweden 18 902 20 1418 20 2102 
22 Switzerland 17 971 17 1619 22 1824 
24 Austria 21 779 22 1382 24 1781 
23 Portugal 24 667 23 1267 23 1805 
25 Greece 28 512 26 1182 25 1423 
31 Finland 25 579 33 715 31 1039 
34 Denmark 33 417 34 679 34 913 
40 Czech Republic NA NA NA 477 40 748 
38 Norway 37 354 NA 514 38 816 
* 1998 data for the Netherlands is based on estimated sales only. 
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trade balance throughout the last decade. Between 1985 and 1998, the EU 
pharmaceutical sector has shown good trade performance compared to the US and 
Japan, with a trade balance that continued to rise. Even if the share of EU-15 
exports to the US has increased, the rest of the world remains the main destination. 
Conversely, US exports are directed in a much larger proportion towards developed 
markets as compared to Europe
5
.  
                                            
5
One is to warn however that trade data in the drug sector may reflect decisions to locate production 
and marketing activities by pharmaceutical multinationals.  
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Table 3: 
International trade of pharmaceutical products (US $ million) 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
EXPORTS FROM EU-15 to: 
Intra-EU-15 4458 6106 7687 8991 9530 12000 13511 16643 16376 19043 23679 25700 26329 30726 
Switzerland & Norway 579 826 973 1069 1140 1498 1675 2082 2420 2471 3262 3263 3492 3935 
Japan 407 640 889 1167 1177 1254 1449 1843 1906 2125 2227 2035 2009 1702 
US 668 827 1006 1125 1246 1395 1710 2191 2291 2767 3636 4002 5282 7815 
Rest of the world 3458 4190 4735 5228 5524 7201 7811 8875 9756 11016 13551 14725 16156 17175 
Total world exports 9570 12589 15290 17580 18617 23347 26157 31634 32749 37421 46355 49725 53268 61353 
Total extra-EU-15 exports 5112 6483 7603 8589 9087 11348 12646 14991 16373 18378 22676 24025 26939 30627 
IMPORTS TO EU-15 from:               
Intra-EU-15 4517 6254 7806 9209 9989 12965 14928 17722 17121 20023 25307 26351 27127 31490 
Extra-EU-15 2197 2916 3513 4031 4434 5663 6400 7706 8059 8719 10961 12344 12472 14426 
Total world imports 6714 9170 11319 13240 14423 18628 21328 25428 25180 28742 36268 38695 39599 45916 
PHARMAC. TRADE BALANCE 
Extra EU-15 2915 3567 4090 4558 4653 5685 6246 7285 8314 9659 11715 11681 14467 16201 
Extra-EU-15 Export/Import 
ratio 
2.33 2.22 2.16 2.13 2.05 2.00 1.98 1.94 2.03 2.11 2.07 1.95 2.16 2.12 
EXPORTS FROM US to:               
EU-15 1162 1448 1459 1855 1686 1858 2070 2441 2508 2564 2811 3300 3819 4635 
Switzerland & Norway 78 92 100 145 81 96 94 150 185 400 230 186 187 437 
Japan 571 634 686 793 785 764 810 817 849 836 933 846 852 881 
Rest of the world 979 1039 1103 1297 1108 1385 1635 1949 2204 2292 2459 2828 3179 3708 
Total world exports 2790 3214 3348 4089 3660 4103 4609 5357 5747 6092 6433 7160 8037 9661 
IMPORTS TO THE US 
Total world import 1718 2084 2498 3235 2117 2540 3092 3861 4198 4755 5605 7150 8737 10982 
PHARMAC. TRADE BALANCE 
Trade balance 1072 1130 850 854 1543 1563 1517 1496 1549 1337 828 10 -700 -1321 
Export/import ratio 1.62 1.54 1.34 1.26 1.73 1.62 1.49 1.39 1.37 1.28 1.15 1.00 0.92 0.88 
EXPORTS FROM JAPAN to: 
EU 15 114 158 191 237 258 316 394 562 572 562 721 732 737 678 
Switzerland & Norway 8 7 8 11 9 10 17 10 20 14 19 23 33 47 
US 98 134 146 165 202 197 248 313 372 454 503 547 605 685 
Rest of the world 171 215 244 303 299 354 431 485 514 525 602 587 577 505 
Total world exports 391 513 589 717 768 877 1089 1370 1478 1556 1845 1889 1952 1915 
IMPORTS TO JAPAN               
Total world import 1292 1724 2110 265+9 2732 2849 3313 3681 3947 4243 4917 4501 4242 3751 
PHARMAC. TRADE BALANCE 
Trade balance -901 -1211 -1521 -1942 -1964 -1972 -2224 -2311 -2469 -2687 -3072 -2612 -2290 -1836 
Export/import ratio 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.51 
Source: OECD World Trade Statistics, various issues. Note: Europe is EU-15 lus 
Switzerland and Norway.  
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In 1997, the industry employed in the EU-15 almost 475,000 people, up from 
slightly less than 400,000 in 1985. The share of pharmaceutical employment in 
total manufacturing in the EU-15 has increased from 1.52% in 1985 to 1.94% in 
1997, compared to 0.94-1 27% in the US, and 0.91- 8% in Japan6.  The share of 
pharmaceutical value added in total manufacturing has increased in the same 
period from 2.24% to 3.35%, compared to 2.28-3.39% and 2.65-3.46% in the US 
and Japan, respectively.
7
  
Trends in R&D spending for the period 1986-1995 are shown in Table 5. The 
amount spent on R&D increased in all the three regions. The US rank first in terms 
                                            
6
See EU Commission, 1997, and Panorama of EU Industry (CD-ROM), 2000. 
7
 See also U.S.I.T.C., 1991 and 1999.  
Table 4: 
Destination of pharmaceutical exports, percentages 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
EXTRA-EU EXPORTS FROM 
EU-15 to: 
              
Switzerland & Norway 11.3 12.7 12.8 12.4 12.5 13.2 13.2 13.9 14.8 13.4 14.4 13.6 13.0 12.8 
Japan 7.96 9.87 11.7 13.6 13.0 11.0 11.5 12.3 11.6 11.6 9.8 8.5 7.5 5.6 
US 13.1 12.8 13.2 13.1 13.7 12.3 13.5 14.6 14.0 15.1 16.0 16.7 19.6 25.5 
Rest of the world 67.6 64.6 62.3 60.9 60.8 63.5 61.8 59.2 59.6 59.9 59.8 61.3 60.0 56.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
               
Extra-EU/Intra-EU exports 1.15 1.06 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.90 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.93 1.02 1.00 
               
EXPORTS FROM US to:               
EU-15 41.6 45.1 43.6 45.4 46.1 45.3 44.9 45.6 43.6 42.1 43.7 46.1 47.5 48.0 
Switzerland & Norway 2.81 2.86 2.97 3.54 2.21 2.33 2.05 2.81 3.23 6.57 3.58 2.6 2.3 4.5 
Japan 20.5 19.7 20.5 19.4 21.5 18.6 17.6 15.3 14.8 13.7 14.5 11.8 10.6 9.1 
Rest of the world 35.1 32.3 32.9 31.7 30.3 33.7 35.5 36.4 38.4 37.6 38.2 39.5 39.6 38.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
               
EXPORTS FROM JAPAN to:               
EU 15 29.2 30.7 32.4 33.1 33.6 36 36.1 41 38.7 36.1 39.1 38.8 37.8 35.4 
Switzerland & Norway 1.96 1.37 1.39 1.58 1.15 1.13 1.53 0.72 1.36 0.93 1.01 1.2 1.7 2.5 
US 25.2 26.1 24.7 23.0 26.3 22.5 22.8 22.8 25.2 29.2 27.3 29.0 31.0 35.8 
Rest of the world 43.7 41.8 41.5 42.3 38.9 40.3 39.5 35.4 34.8 33.8 32.6 31.1 29.5 26.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
                        Source: OECD World Trade Statistics, various issues. Note: Europe is EU-15 plus Switzerland and Norway. 
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of both R&D spending and ratio of R&D to production, consolidating their 
supremacy during the Nineties. In 1995, the ratio of R&D to production for the US 
was 4 percentage points higher than Japan and 5.5 points higher than the EU.  
 
Over the last fifteen years, both the value of production and employment have 
increased steadily in Europe, the USA and – to a lesser extent – in Japan  (Figures 
1 and 2).  
Table 5: 
R&D spending (millions of ECU) 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
At current X-rate           
EU-15 3416 4034 4690 5352 6070 6474 6989 7181 7407 7708 
United States 3954 3917 4436 5474 5357 6394 7163 8955 9329 9042 
Japan 2073 2285 2748 3001 2810 3544 3918 4834 5216 5221 
           
At PPP X-rate           
EU-15 3355 3969 4591 5252 6028 6365 6952 7231 7427 7701 
United States 3621 4170 4891 5681 6418 7624 8703 9792 1037
5 
1107
0 
Japan 1480 1684 1907 2157 2493 2921 3209 3183 3257 3371 
           
At current exchange rate, as a % of production           
EU-15 8.3 9.1 9.3 9.6 10.1 9.5 9.4 9.5 9.4 8.9 
United States 11.3 11.5 11.9 12.3 12.7 13.0 13.7 14.8 14.6 14.4 
Japan 8.7 8.7 8.9 9.0 10.0 11.0 11.6 11.1 11.1 10.3 
Source: OECD, 1998 (for R&D expenses) and EU Commission, “Panorama of the EU 
industry” (for data on production).  
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Figure 1:
Production Value: EU-15, US, Japan
(Nace 244)
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In the Nineties, significant differences and increasing divergence across European 
countries are observed, (Figures 3 and 4). The French industry shows a steady and 
considerable growth and the non EU-4 countries -especially Sweden, Ireland, 
Netherlands, and Denmark- literally take off, especially in the more recent years. 
Conversely, Italy declines sharply in the early Nineties, while Germany slows 
down in the last five years. With respect to its major competitors, Europe lags 
Figure 2:
Total Employment: EU-15, US, Japan
(Nace 244)
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behind the US (and also Japan) in terms of value added and according to different 
measures of productivity and competitiveness. Figures 1 and 2 show that both 
Production Value and Employment are higher in the EU-15 than in the US and 
Japan. Notably, the EU-15 employment in the industry has been roughly twice 
higher than the US during 1985-1997.  
 
 
 
Figure 3:
Production Value: EU4 and non-EU4
(Nace 244)
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Table 6 reports the share of pharmaceutical labour costs on total production value 
in the EU-15, the US, and Japan, along with individual European countries.  The 
Table also reports the share of the value of other "non-labour  inputs.  The latter 
was computed by subtracting labour costs from the value added.  Since value added 
is equal to labour compensation plus the compensation to other "internal" factors of 
production, we took this to be a measure of a bundle of inputs different from 
labour. Apart from physical capital, in the pharmaceutical industry this measure is 
likely to include R&D capital inputs.  The Table also reports the share of total 
value added (which is the sum of the latter two shares) on the value of production.  
This provides a measure of the extent to which the industry relies on internally 
Figure 4:
Total Employment: EU4 and non-EU4
(Nace 244)
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generated inputs vis-à-  inputs purchased from third parties.  The shares in the 
Table are averages across 1992-19 7 and 1986-1991. 
 
 
 
Table 6:  
Labour share and share of other non-labour inputs on production value  
(avg for 1992-1997 and 1986-1991) 
 1992-1997 1986-1991 
 
 Share of 
personnel 
costs  
Share of 
non-
labour 
inputs (*) 
 
Share of 
value 
added 
Share of 
personnel 
costs  
Share of 
non-
labour 
inputs (*) 
 
Share of 
value 
added 
EU-15 23.21% 16.58% 39.78% 24.92% 15.64% 40.56% 
United States 13.50% 57.55% 71.05% 15.58% 55.32% 70.89% 
Japan 12.57% 53.60% 66.17% 12.90% 53.31% 66.21% 
       
Denmark 26.50% 26.99% 53.49% 26.99% 21.78% 48.77% 
Germany 33.11% 9.36% 42.47% 31.81% 12.00% 43.81% 
Spain 23.00% 14.33% 37.33% 27.73% 10.56% 38.29% 
France 18.87% 14.00% 32.87% 20.18% 13.22% 33.39% 
Ireland 10.69% 42.18% 52.87% 14.11% 33.06% 47.17% 
Italy 22.74% 13.99% 36.73% 23.46% 13.50% 36.96% 
Netherlands 18.43% 14.91% 33.33% 22.86% 11.18% 34.05% 
Austria 23.17% 17.80% 40.97% Na Na Na 
Finland 26.44% 21.68% 48.12% 24.12% 25.14% 49.26% 
Sweden 18.42% 30.59% 49.01% Na Na Na 
United Kingdom 21.69% 28.40% 50.09% 23.60% 30.23% 53.83% 
Na = not available 
Source: Our calculations from Eurostat data 
 (*) Value of non labour inputs computed as total value added minus personnel costs. 
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The Table shows that the share of labour cost in Europe is higher than in the US 
and Japan, and this is stable across the two periods.  This suggests that the 
European industry is more labour-intensive than the US or Japanese ones.  One 
could argue that the higher share of labour cost in Europe may reflect higher labour 
cost charges.  In fact, there is no reason why this should be so compared to Japan.  
Moreover, the other two shares in Table 6 show that not only do the US and Japan 
have a higher share of non-lab ur inputs, but also of value added as a whole. The 
difference is indeed substantial, with the US and Japanese firms showing a share of 
about 65-70% compared to 40% in Europe.  This is suggestive of the presence in 
Europe of a relatively larger share of fringe companies that are specialised in low 
value added activities, like manufacturing and commercialisation of products 
licensed from other companies, or simply of low value added medical or medical-
like substances.    
These differences across the three regions prompted a deeper analysis of the factors 
Table 7: 
Decomposition of pharmaceutical growth -- contribution of labour, non-labour inputs and 
total factor productivity (TFP) (avg for 1992-1997 and 1986-1991) 
 1992-1997  1986-1991 
 Total 
growth 
 
Labour Non-labour 
inputs 
TFP  Total 
growth 
 
Labour Non-labour 
inputs 
TFP 
EU-15 5.81% 0.14% 1.32% 4.35%  9.14% 0.62% 1.39% 7.13% 
United States 8.44% 0.40% 4.84% 3.20%  7.18% 0.31% 4.43% 2.43% 
Japan 4.71% -0.08% 2.65% 2.15%  6.82% 0.04% 4.40% 2.39% 
          
Denmark 6.43% 1.77% 1.90% 2.76%  8.72% 0.72% 4.54% 3.46% 
Germany 2.25% -0.49% -0.74% 3.48%  7.74% 0.82% 0.89% 6.03% 
Spain 3.16% -0.23% 0.97% 2.42%  13.36% 0.56% 1.66% 11.14% 
France 5.28% -0.10% 1.30% 4.08%  9.61% 0.61% 1.43% 7.57% 
Ireland 22.89% 1.64% 11.62% 9.63%  10.40% 1.11% 2.68% 6.61% 
Italy 2.02% 0.22% 0.67% 1.12%  10.28% 0.49% 0.82% 8.98% 
Netherlands 11.94% 0.46% 3.93% 7.54%  8.46% 0.26% -0.45% 8.66% 
Austria 1.93% 0.11% 0.94% 0.87%  Na Na Na Na 
Finland 6.95% 2.53% 0.12% 4.30%  10.32% 0.31% 4.26% 5.75% 
Sweden 14.24% 0.80% 3.35% 10.09%  Na Na Na Na 
United Kingdom 7.04% 0.05% 1.72% 5.28%  7.72% 0.66% 2.55% 4.51% 
Note: Contribution of labour and non-lab ur inputs was computed by the usual growth accounting 
procedure, notably gS = wL*gL + wK*gK + residual, where wL is the share of personnel costs on 
production value and wK is the share of the value of non-labour inputs on production value.  The 
value of non-labour input is the difference between value added and personnel costs; gS, gL, and gK 
are respectively the growth rates of production value, number of employees, and non- abour inputs.  
The residual, or TFP, is the difference between gS a d the first two terms of this expression. 
Computations based on Eurostat data.  
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that may drive the growth of the drug sector.  Table 7 uses Eurostat data to 
decompose the growth in production value in the three areas during 1992-1997 a d
1986-1991. We employed the typical growth accounting procedure, which divides 
the growth in sales into the part explained by the growth of its measureable inputs 
(typically labour and capital) – weighted by their cost shares – nd the growth not 
explained by the growth in the inputs.
8
 In our analysis, we distinguished between  
the growth in labour employment and the growth in the non-labour inputs defined 
as value added minus labour costs. 
From Table 7 first notice that compared to the US and Japan, Europe fared the 
highest average growth in the value of pharmaceutical production during 1986-
1991.  By contrast, the average g owth of the European industry declines in 1992-
1997, while the US growth increases, and it overcomes the European rate.  Second, 
in both periods the growth of production in Europe is accounted for largely by the 
residual total factor productivity (TFP).  In the US and Japan, in both periods, 
production growth is explained mostly by the growth in the non-labour input, i.e. 
capital and R&D assets.  This suggests that not only is the European industry more 
labour intensive, but it responds less substantially to growth in non-labour inputs 
like research or capital.  The industry in Europe responds mainly to "exogenous" 
factors unrelated to the growth in these inputs.  
Table 7 also highlights some specific patterns of individual European countries.  
Most notably, there is a fairly pronounced decline in the growth of production 
value between the two period in Germany, Italy, Spain, and partly in France.  By 
contrast, the growth rates either increase or remain fairly high in the smaller 
European countries, and particularly in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden.  In the UK, the growth rate in production values remains around 7% per 
year. 
                                            
8
 See for instance Jorgenson  
  
 
 
 
 
24 
Interestingly enough, in all the European countries, whether their growth is 
increasing or not, the weights of non-labour inputs vs TFP are always balanced 
towards the latter. That is, irrespective of their performance in the more recent 
years, these countries show the same pattern, notably that measurable inputs, and 
particularly the growth in R&D or capital, do not translate directly into production 
growth.  The only exception is Ireland, which shows a remarkable annual growth 
(23%) in the 1992-1997 period.  This is clearly related to the various peculiarities 
of the Irish economy which has started growing at bewildering rates during the past 
decade.  It is also probably related to the well known pattern of domestic location 
of multinational corporations, lured by tax incentives.  It is nonetheless interesting 
that not only is Irish pharmaceuticals growing at a very high rat , but this is the 
only European country where the contribution to growth by the non-la our input 
appears to be rather substantial.  In short, Ireland seems to be the European country 
which resembles more closely the patterns observed for the US and Japan.  
Whether this is because US drug multinationals increasingly locate in Ireland or for 
other reasons is an issue that goes beyond the scope of this Report.
9
 
                                            
9
 Note that since we are using production value rather than sales as our measure for the growth of the 
industry, the patterns that we observe for Ireland, like for all the other countries, reflect genuine 
increase in production activities in the country, rather than, for ins ance, mere invoicing in Ireland by 
multinational corporations for tax purposes.  Clearly, the increase in production in Ireland may reflect 
an increasing investment in the region by multinational firms rather than being growth by local 
companies. 
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III.  The European and US Multinationals: Comparative Performance 
Large, diversified, multinational corporations play a crucial role in the drug 
industry. In this Section, we analyse some important indicators of performance, 
comparing the European and US largest companies.  
Despite the high R&D intensity and the highly skewed distribution of product 
market sizes, the concentration of the pharmaceutical industry is low, albeit slightly 
increasing, mainly as a consequence of processes of M&A (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8: 
Market Concentration in Selected Countries, Corporate Groups 
 Corporate Groups 
 Top 10 Top 25 
 1994 1999 1994 1999 
UNITED STATES * 52.82 47.87 81.50 84.51 
JAPAN 38.38 37.25 64.18 63.65 
SWITZERLAND * 49.90 51.57 71.62 75.58 
AUSTRIA * 43.09 44.89 72.95 73.29 
BELGIUM * 43.54 48.36 75.82 78.86 
CZECH REPUBLIC * 48.79 44.64 69.46 69.09 
DENMARK 58.01 53.22 85.33 84 
FINLAND * 69.15 62.49 88.70 85.13 
FRANCE 47.88 52.2 76.38 77.99 
GERMANY * 34.97 38.35 61.79 64.9 
GREECE 45.71 47.62 75.01 78.91 
HUNGARY 65.34 58.91 86.83 86.48 
IRELAND 48.82 50.17 77.01 77.62 
ITALY *  44.18 44.68 70.06 73.19 
LUXEMBOURG 44.04 51.15 73.14 76.46 
NORWAY * 66.19 58.95 90.83 85.3 
POLAND * 39.82 36.72 68.77 63.27 
PORTUGAL 40.30 41.85 70.26 72.56 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC * 55.86 49.45 76.65 75.24 
SLOVENIA 81.35 72.6 94.23 92.05 
SPAIN 39.47 40.27 67.12 69.8 
SWEDEN * 68.02 56.87 88.22 82.49 
UNITED KINGDOM * 48.04 49.13 71.53 71.39 
Source: IMS International. * Including hospital sales 
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The low concentration of the industry can be explained by some specific features 
of its competitive dynamics. First, the industry is composed by many therapeutic 
classes and by a wide range of technologies. Second, the successful introduction of 
a new drug within a given class is generally the first outcome of intense “races” to 
innovate, in which first mover advantages can be not long lasting. In general, any 
major innovation is followed, well before patent expiry and generic competition, 
by both product and process innovations by competitors, that can substantially 
erode the market power of the early innovator. Then, the expiration of the original 
patent marks a significant “market shock”, with generic firms and products 
expanding on the market. Third, the degree to which early innovators enjoy an 
advantage in introducing later major drugs within the same family of molecules 
tends to be limited
10
. This, jointly with the coexistence of several compounds or 
variations thereupon targeted to the same pathology, generally hinders the 
persistence of dominant positions in any individual market.  
Data presented in Tables 9 and 10 show a marked process of globalisation within 
the industry. Table 9 covers the period from 1985 to 1998. The Table shows that in 
all the largest markets a significant reduction of the share controlled by local 
corporations. Data presented in  Table 10 confirms this process of globalisation of 
the industry. Moreover, Table 10 shows the good performance of firms that belong 
to the core of the industry and are located in the US, UK, France, Switzerland, and 
Denmark. On the contrary, one can observe a declining pattern for German firms 
and the fall of Italy. Over the 1990s the US share of the world market has 
increased, driven by the growth of the internal market and by the control of a larger 
share of the European market. At the same time, Table 10 reveals that the European 
multinationals as well have increased their market share in the US
11
.  
                                            
10
 Sutton, 1998; Bottazzi, Dosi, Lippi, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000.  
11
 For further details see Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000.  
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As it is shown in Table 11, the headquarters of the largest pharmaceutical 
companies are located in Western Europe and the US, and Japan. Both in 1989 and 
in 1998, the top 10 pharmaceutical companies in terms of worldwide sales were 
headquartered in either the US or Western Europe. While no Japanese firms are 
among the top 10 companies, several Japanese firms fall in the next tier of top 
worldwide pharmaceutical sales
12
.  
Table 11 confirms the good performance, as measured by market shares, of the 
largest European corporations in the last fifteen years. This result is robust, 
especially if one considers the lower size and rates of growth of the European 
market vis à vis the American one.  
This result is not disconfirmed by data on the distribution of the 50 top selling new 
chemical entities launched, worldwide, in the two five-years periods 1985-1989 
and 1995-1999 (see Table 12). Moreover, Table 13, which shows the R&D 
expenditures and the ratio R&D/sales for the top 10 pharmaceutical corporations, 
suggests that the R&D intensity of the largest pharmaceutical corporations is at 
least as high as that of their American counterparts.  
However, two major qualifications must be introduced.  
First, coming back to the 1989-1998 comparison of Table 11, it results that all 
European companies appearing in the top 10 ranking in 1999 have had to go 
through a significant merger or acquisition in order to remain in the top 10, whic  
is not the case for their American counterparts.  
Second, data presented in the second part of Table 12 indicate that the sales of 
major innovative products by the US multinationals have increased more 
significantly than those of the European multinationa s in the 1990s. As it is well 
known, only a very small fraction of the patented compounds turns out to have 
significant therapeutic and economic value. Thus, New Chemical Entities (that is, 
                                            
12
 See USITC, 1999, p. 3-1; Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000.  
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drugs whose active ingredients have not been previously approved for therapeutic 
use) provide the most relevant indication of competitiveness based on innovation 
capabilities. On this, it is important to notice that US companies have gained a 
clear and growing leadership in terms of the relevance, as measured by sales and 
geographical diffusion of New Chemical Entities (NCEs) launched on the market 
place
13
. As it is shown in Table 12, the share in terms of sales of NCEs launched by 
US corporations over the total sales generated by the first 50 NCEs on the market 
rises dramatically in the Nineties to reach almost 70%, while the share of Japan 
falls drastically. Both the Swiss and the Europe’s share rises somewhat, with a 
significant increase of the UK and above all France, while Germany’ share drops to 
3%. In addition, Table 14 shows that in 1999 more than 80% of the total sales of 
the world top 15 drugs was originated by US companies, with a dramatic increase 
in the last decade and a corresponding sharp fall of Japanese and German 
corporations.  
Finally, and this is an important point, the portfolio of products held by European 
multinationals tends to be older than that of the US firms, which suggests that there 
are differences in research productivity in recent years (see Table 15).  
The evidence presented in this section can be interpreted by referring to two 
mechanims.  
On the one side, our results can be explained based on the evidences according to 
which an increasing fraction of major new drugs, diffused across the most 
important markets worldwide, has US origins, also thanks to the innovative output 
of some of the older “New Biotechnology Firms”, like Amgen, Chiron, Biogen, 
Genzyme.  In fact, the evidence presented in this section shows that US firms are 
now the dominant source of innovation and innovative drugs, with Europe lagging 
behind.  
                                            
13
 See Council on Competitiveness, 1998.  
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On the other side, especially as for the oligopolistic core of the industry, our results 
are explained by the strong differences in absolute sizes and in rates of growth of 
demand between Europe and the US.  As we already pointed out, the US 
pharmaceutical market has grown from being roughly equal to the European 
market at the beginning of the 1990s to almost twice as much in very recent years.  
In our analysis, we are unable to distinguish whether the growth of the US market 
in the 1990s stems from higher prices or it is a genuine growth in demand. The size 
of the increase suggests that it cannot be just increases in prices (even though there 
can be some of it as well).  In other words, the restructuring of pharmaceutical 
demand, and particularly of the health care system, in the US, has translated into 
demand growth, which has benefited mainly the US firms. In fact, in spite of their 
multinational nature, the bulk of the sales of the US and European firms is still in 
their own markets (see again Table 11a vs. 11b).  It is therefore natural that the US 
firms have taken greater advantage of the growing demand in their own country.  
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Table 9: 
Market Shares in Selected Countries, by Nationality of Corporation 
 1985 1989 1998 
Change in share 
1998-1989, 
percentage points 
USA     
USA 74.7 69.59 63.32 -11.38 
Japan 0 0.17 1.7 1.7 
Switzerland 8.7 8.64 7.84 -0.86 
EU-15 12.8 20.39 24.58 11.78 
Others 3.8 1.21 2.56 -1.24 
JAPAN      
Japan 76.4 79 78.36 1.96 
USA 8.7 8.22 8.34 -0.36 
Switzerland 3.3 3.56 3.55 0.25 
EU-15 5.6 8.88 9.63 4.03 
Others 6 0.34 0.12 -5.88 
GERMANY      
Germany 56.6 55.03 45.06 -11.54 
Others EU-15 12.8 15 19.67 6.87 
USA 17.8 18.03 22.13 4.33 
Japan 0.2 0.57 1.72 1.52 
Switzerland 9.3 7.67 10.36 1.06 
Others 3.3 3.7 1.06 -2.24 
UK     
UK 33.4 42.73 24.45 -8.95 
Others EU-15 17.2 19.03 23.75 6.55 
USA 35.3 28.44 32.13 -3.17 
Japan 0 0 0.94 0.94 
Switzerland 7 6.48 7.26 0.26 
Others 7.1 3.32 11.47 4.37 
FRANCE     
France 51.6 48.46 36.86 -14.74 
Others EU-15 20 23.72 29.25 9.25 
USA 20.6 20.17 24.03 3.43 
Japan 0 0.06 1 1 
Switzerland 6.7 6.71 7.76 1.06 
Others 1.1 0.88 1.1 0 
ITALY      
Italy 39.6 42.43 25.76 -13.84 
Others EU-15 27.8 27.34 32.36 4.56 
USA 17.6 19.32 27.09 9.49 
Japan 0 0.18 1.17 1.17 
Switzerland 9.4 9.1 12.62 3.22 
Others 5.6 1.63 1 -4.6 
SPAIN     
Spain 37 30.68 24.8 -12.2 
Others EU-15 32.6 38.14 39.98 7.38 
USA 15.3 16.8 23.55 8.25 
Japan 0.1 0.12 1.3 1.2 
Switzerland 12.2 11.59 9.39 -2.81 
Others 2.8 2.67 0.98 -1.82 
Source: IMS International. * Including hospital sales 
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Table 10: 
Shares of Top100 Corporate Groups, by Nationality of Corporation, Major Markets 
 Nationality of Corporation* 
Market USA Japan Switzerland EU-15 Germany UK France Italy Sweden Denmark Netherlands Belgium 
1985             
World 34.2 13.1 7.7 24.8 9.6 9.2 2.8 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.6 
North America 64.3 0.0 8.8 18.6 4.3 12.9 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 
Europe 19.9 0.0 8.5 44.5 18.1 10.6 7.9 3.5 1.5 0.5 1.1 1.3 
A/A/A 11.4 49.3 4.8 10.7 5.8 3.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 
Latin America 34.4 0.0 11.1 22.9 14.8 4.5 2.2 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.2 
1989             
World 31.2 15.7 10.1 24.7 9.6 7.4 3.2 2.1 1 0.4 0.5 0.5 
North America 62 0.1 5.2 24.7 14 8.8 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Europe 20.3 0.2 17.3 38.0 11.3 8.3 8.1 5.2 2.4 0.7 1 1 
A/A/A 11.1 51.7 6.6 10.2 4 4.4 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 
Latin America 30.9 0 15.9 22.8 5.7 12 3.3 1 0.2 0 0.6 0 
1998             
World 36.0 11.0 8.0 28.8 10.0 9.0 4.4 0.6 2.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 
North America 58.5 1.5 7.9 24.8 6.8 11.6 1.8 0.0 3.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 
Europe 25.4 0.9 9.6 45.3 15.3 10.2 9.8 1.8 3.7 1.7 0.9 1.5 
A/A/A 12.3 46.1 5.1 14.3 6.3 4.1 1.7 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.2 
Latin America 28.6 0.2 11.9 27.8 16.1 5.8 4.1 0.1 0.7 0.0 1.0 0.0 
1999             
World 39.0 11.1 7.7 27.8 7.3 11.9 6.1 0.5 - 0.7 0.6 0.6 
North America 60.2 1.9 7.6 24.0 4.8 14.9 3.0 0 - 0.3 0.5 0.5 
Europe 26.1 1.3 9.5 45.7 12.3 13.8 13.0 2.1 - 1.7 0.9 1.5 
A/A/A 14.4 45.8 5.1 15.4 4.6 5.5 3.8 0 - 0.9 0.4 0.2 
Latin America 29.6 0.2 11.7 26.7 12.1 6.6 6.7 0.2 - 0.1 0.9 0.1 
* Location of Headquarters. Source: IMS International 
Table 11a: 
Top 20 Pharmaceutical Corporations: Decomposition of Worldwide Sales: Major 
Geographical Markets, 1989 
  Crp. Nat.*  North America Europe Asia/Africa/Austrr.alia Latin America 
1989             
1 MERCK & CO USA 4719 2656,8 56,3 1198,6 25,4 726,7 15,4 132,1 2,8 
2 BRISTOL-MYERS SQB. USA 4132 2363,5 57,2 1012,3 24,5 491,7 11,9 264,5 6,4 
3 GLAXO UK 3662 1680,88 45,9 1490,4 40,7 399,2 10,9 95,2 2,6 
4 SMITHKLINE BEECHAM UK 3488 1559,1 44,7 1332,4 38,2 467,4 13,4 132,5 3,8 
5 CIBA-GEIGY SWI 3382 1376,5 40,7 1231,0 36,4 551,3 16,3 223,2 6,6 
6 AMERICAN HOME USA 3157 2288,8 72,5 539,8 17,1 151,5 4,8 179,9 5,7 
7 HOECHST FRG 2869 430,3 15 1600,9 55,8 645,5 22,5 192,2 6,7 
8 JOHNSON & JOHNSON USA 2742 1763,1 64,3 726,6 26,5 109,7 4 145,3 5,3 
9 BAYER FRG 2667 634,7 23,8 1144,1 42,9 749,4 28,1 136,0 5,1 
10 SANDOZ SWI 2520 831,6 33 985,3 39,1 584,6 23,2 118,4 4,7 
11 LILLY USA 2460 1894,2 77 403,4 16,4 61,5 2,5 100,8 4,1 
12 PFIZER USA 2363 1224,0 51,8 484,4 20,5 548,2 23,2 103,9 4,4 
13 ROCHE SWI 2248 818,3 36,4 856,5 38,1 348,4 15,5 222,5 9,9 
14 SCHERING PLOUGH USA 1890 1203,9 63,7 330,7 17,5 230,6 12,2 126,6 6,7 
15 MAR. MER. DOW USA 1876 1468,9 78,3 275,8 14,7 123,8 6,6 9,3 0,5 
16 UPJOHN USA 1816 1218,5 67,1 243,3 13,4 279,7 15,4 72,6 4 
17 BOEHRINGER INGEL FRG 1766 418,5 23,7 856,5 48,5 305,5 17,3 185,4 10,5 
18 WARNER-LAMBERT USA 1679 1000,7 59,6 444,9 26,5 162,9 9,7 70,5 4,2 
19 CYANAMID USA 1662 746,2 44,9 486,9 29,3 393,9 23,7 34,9 2,1 
20 ABBOTT USA 1659 1081,7 65,2 290,3 17,5 147,6 8,9 139,3 8,4 
* Location of Headquarters. Source: IMS International 
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Table 11b:  
Top 20 Pharmaceutical Corporations: Decomposition of Worldwide Sales: Major 
Geographical Markets, 1998 
   Crp. Nat.*  North America Europe Asia/Africa/Austrr.alia Latin America 
1998              
1 NOVARTIS SWI 10724 4396,8 41 3764,1 35,1 1640,8 15,3 922,3 8,6 
2 MERCK & CO USA 10660 6182,8 58 3091,4 29 980,7 9,2 415,7 3,9 
3 GLAXO WELLCOME UK 10616 5361,1 50,5 3588,2 33,8 1157,1 10,9 509,6 4,8 
4 PFIZER USA 9928 6145,4 61,9 1935,9 19,5 1360,1 13,7 486,5 4,9 
5 BRISTOL-MEYER SQB. USA 9855 6366,3 64,6 1990,7 20,2 670,1 6,8 837,7 8,5 
6 JOHNSON & JOHNSON USA 9075 6298,1 69,4 1833,1 20,2 426,5 4,7 517,3 5,7 
7 AMERICAN HOME USA 7855 5082,2 64,7 1633,8 20,8 479,1 6,1 659,8 8,4 
8 ROCHE SWI 7712 2907,4 37,7 2930,5 38 933,1 12,1 933,1 12,1 
9 SMITH.  BEECHAM UK 7400 4181 56,5 2878,6 38,9 673,4 9,1 407 5,5 
10 LILLY  USA 7398 5082,4 68,7 1516,6 20,5 458,6 6,2 340,3 4,6 
11 ASTRA SWE 6959 3590,8 51,6 2755,7 39,6 480,2 6,9 132,2 1,9 
12 ABBOTT USA 6383 4697,9 73,6 765,9 12 504,2 7,9 414,9 6,5 
13 HOECHST GER 6269 1749,1 27,9 2564,0 40,9 1247,5 19,9 702,1 11,2 
14 SCHERING PLOUGH USA 6191 4327,5 69,9 1002,9 16,2 359,1 5,8 501,5 8,1 
15 WARNER-LAMBERT USA 5998 4192,6 69,9 1253,6 20,9 311,9 5,2 239,9 4 
16 BAYER GER 5196 2234,3 43 1834,2 35,3 670,3 12,9 457,2 8,8 
17 RHONE POULENC FRA 4611 1438,6 31,2 2360,8 51,2 474,9 10,3 331,9 7,2 
18 PHARM. & UPJOHN USA 4547 1918,8 42,2 1841,5 40,5 536,5 11,8 250,1 5,5 
19 ZENECA UK 3793 1873,7 49,4 1384,4 36,5 390,7 10,3 140,3 3,7 
20 BOHERINGER INGEL GER 3659 1053,8 28,8 1375,8 37,6 651,3 17,8 581,7 15,9 
* Location of Headquarters. Source: IMS International 
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Table 12: 
Top 50 NCEs by Origin of Corporation* 
Number of NCEs Nationality of the Main 
Producer Corporation* 1985-1989 1995-1999 
USA 17 24 
Japan 20 3 
Switzerland 3 6 
EU-15 10 16 
UK 3 8 
Germany 7 4 
Netherlands 0 1 
France 0 3 
Sales (%) 
 1985-1989 1995-1999 
USA 41.49 69.12 
Japan 37.33 3.92 
Switzerland 2.91 7.78 
EU-15 18.28 18.54 
UK 6.53 9.38 
Germany 11.75 3.33 
Netherlands 0.00 0.80 
France 0.00 5.03 
*
Location of Headquarters. Source: IMS 
  
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13:  
Pharmaceutical R&D Expenditures, Top 10 Pharmaceutical Corporations, 1999 
World 
Ranking 
1999 
Company Nationality* Pharma R&D Expenditures 
(US$m) 
R&D as % of 
Sales 
1 Merck&Co. USA    1,821.1 11.9% 
2 AstraZeneca UK 2,183 17.1% 
3 GlaxoWellcome UK    1,927.5 14.6% 
4 Pfizer USA NA NA 
5 Bristol Myers Squibb USA 1,559 12.4% 
6 Novartis SWI    1,801.3 16.1% 
7 Aventis FRA NA NA 
8 Johnson&Johnson USA 1,400 16.4% 
8 American Home 
Products 
USA    1,389.9 15.6% 
10 Roche SWI    1,893.1 19.1% 
* 
Location of Headquarters. Source: Scrip League Tables.  
Table 14: 
World Top 15 Drugs, by Origin of Main Producer Corporation 
Nationality of the Main 
Producer Corporation* 
Total sales, $ 
million, 1989 
% Total sales, $ 
million, 1999 
% 
US 1697 47.94 11227 82.06 
Japan 1173 33.14 460 3.36 
Switzerland 0 - 835 6.10 
EU-15 670 18.93 557 4.07 
UK 243 6.86 557 4.07 
Germany 427 12.06 0 - 
France 0 - 0 - 
Sweden 0 - 0 - 
Other EU 0 - 0 - 
Other non EU 0 - 0 - 
Total 3540 100 13682 100 
 * Location of Headquarters. Source: IMS 
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Table 15: 
Recent Products’ Contribution to Total Sales: Top 100 Global 
Corporations*, 1997 
 % of Total 1997 sales from NCEs launched since 1988 
USA 32 
Japan 29 
Switzerland 14 
EU-15 16 
* Location of Headquarters. Source: IMS 
Source: IMS 
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IV. R&D and Innovation as Sources of Competitive Advantages  
IV.1 The Division of Innovative Labour in Pharmaceuticals 
There is little question that innovation constitutes one of the key sources of 
competitiveness in this industry and it is a major determinant of market structure
14
 
European companies, especially the big German and Swiss firms, have been major 
innovators in the industry ever since its inception. Following World War II, and 
also benefiting from the dramatic increase of support to of biomedical research and 
health care expenditure, US and, more recently, also British companies have 
progressively challenged the leadership of Continental Europe, establishing 
themselves as major innovators. However, the innovative core of the industry has 
been traditionally quite small and remarkably stable over time, with practically no 
entry until the mid-Seventies.  
The emergence and stability of such innovative core was a consequence of the 
nature of pharmaceutical R&D, which – until the mid-Seventies –  was based on 
the extensive exploration of chemical compounds and on incremental structural 
modifications of drug prototypes, organised around highly structured processes for 
carrying out mass screening programs. These processes involved large laboratories 
and highly disciplined internal organisational procedures, which became a source 
of first-mover advant ges and of economies of scale in research. Through the 
evolution of the industry, the organisational capabilities developed to manage the 
processes of drug development and delivery – competencies in the management of 
large scale, expensive, clinical trials, the process of gaining regulatory approval as 
well as marketing and distribution – have acted as powerful barriers to entry in the 
industry. Around this core, a large fringe of firms has thrived through imitation and 
                                            
14
 See Gambardella, 1995; Sutton, 1998; Matraves, 1999; Henderson, Orsenigo, Pisano, 1999; 
Bottazzi, Dosi, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000.  
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generic competition after patent expiration as well as through production and 
marketing in local markets and product niches. 
The advent of the so-called “molecular biology” revolution since the mid-Sev nties 
has introduced drastic changes in the relevant knowledge base, in the processes of 
discovery and in the organisation of research, with the emergence of a new 
technological regime and new technological and organisational capabilities as a 
key source of competitive advantages
15
. 
First, the “molecular biology” revolution has opened up new opportu ities for the 
discovery and production of new drugs. At the same time, it has implied a radical 
shift in the knowledge base and in research procedures and methodologies, with the 
transition from quasi-r ndom screening to “guided discovery” or discovery by 
design. Moreover, the importance of publicly generated scientific knowledge for 
industrial innovation has drastically increased
16
.  
These changes have had major consequences on the organisation of research and 
on patterns of division of innovative labour. New technological opportunities have 
made it possible the entry of new firms, mainly specialised suppliers of specific 
techniques and intermediate products to larger companies. Established corporations 
have experienced complex processes of adaptation, absorbing the new knowledge 
base and adopting new, academic-lik , forms of organisation of research, which 
rely crucially on the development of dense networks of collaboration with 
universities, public and private research centres and other companies, especially 
New Biotechnology Firms (NBFs)
17
. Yet, they continue to represent the inner core 
                                            
15
 See Orsenigo, 1989; Gambardella, 1995; Galambos, Sturchio, 1996; Orsenigo, Pammolli, 
Riccaboni, 2000; Drews, 2000.  
16
 See Arora, Gambardella, 1994.  
17
 See, among others, Arora and Gambardella, 1990, Powell et al., 1996; Orsenigo, Pammolli, 
Riccaboni, 2000.  
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of innovators in the industry. Only few of the new firms have succeeded in entering 
into such core. The – largely sunk – costs required for discovery and development 
have increased sharply and – as a consequence – barriers to entry have increased. 
Nowadays, an R&D project for a new drug is likely to last 8-12 years, with a cost 
in the range of US$ 350-6  millions
18
. Moreover, molecular biology and the new 
general-purpose research technologies of combinatorial chemistry, highthroughput 
screening, and genomics, have increased firm-speci ic economies of scope related 
to knowledge spillovers across projects and research trajectories. Finally, large 
innovative corporations play a crucial integrative role across different bodies of 
knowledge as well as providing complementary assets in clinical development, 
regulatory affairs and distribution channels.  
 
 
                                            
18
 See Di Masi, 1991.  
Table 16:  
Shares in terms of Number of Patents, by Location of Inventors* 
 Pharma % Biotech % 
Country 1978-1987 1988-1997 Total 1978-1987 1988-1997 Total 
Canada 0.98 1.54 1.40 0.97 1.93 1.67 
Switzerland 4.08 2.94 3.23 3.61 3.79 3.74 
Germany 18.22 12.80 14.17 13.03 10.03 10.85 
Denmark 0.59 0.80 0.75 1.43 2.35 2.10 
Spain 0.18 0.45 0.38 0.14 0.40 0.32 
France 7.38 9.69 9.11 7.18 6.98 7.04 
Italy 2.85 3.24 3.14 1.06 1.75 1.56 
Japan 15.02 13.64 13.99 22.21 17.06 18.47 
Sweden 2.02 2.18 2.14 2.07 1.07 1.34 
UK 8.59 7.73 7.95 7.12 7.85 7.65 
USA 40.08 44.98 43.74 41.19 46.80 45.25 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
* Location of R&D Labs. Source: Our calculations on European Patent Office 
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IV.2 The US as an increasingly preferred location for invention? 
This section provides some evidence on the geographical location of R&D 
laboratories within the industry, by means of patent data
19
.  
All biotechnological and pharmaceutical European patents (EPO) for 1987-1996 
were analysed. The total number of patents applied for betw en 1987-1996 that 
was found is 45,454. Patent micro-classes were created, to distinguish biotech from 
pharmaceuticals. Then, every patent was assigned to a given country of invention, 
by assigning to the country the share of the inventors in the patent tha  were located 
in the country. Thus, for instance, if a patent has ten inventors, two of which from 
Italy and the others from Germany, we assigned 0.2 to Italy and 0.8 to Germany. 
The vast majority of patents were produced by inventors located in only on  
country.  
Table 16 shows that, both in traditional pharmaceuticals and in biotechnology, the 
share of patents by US inventors has increased in the 1990s compared to the 
1980s.
20
  The share of Japanese and German inventors has instead declined.  France 
grows and overcomes the UK in pharmaceuticals, but not in biotechnology.  
Switzerland loses shares in pharmaceuticals, but grows slightly in biotechnology. 
In general, the relative positions of the US and the EU switch moving from biotech 
vs. pharmaceuticals. This suggests that the US have a comparative advantage in the 
newer biotech fields relative to more traditional pharmaceutical research.  
 
                                            
19
 As it is well known, measuring innovation is difficult and no single indicator usually yields a 
satisfactory picture. It is important to emphasise that in this Report R&D and patents are not used here 
as indicators of, respectively, innovative input and output, but as broad indicators of technological 
activities. See Griliches, 1990.   
20
 EPO data might “overestimate” the patenting performance of Europe and “underestimate” that of 
the US. Here however we are comparing shares over time, and hence this problem may be less severe. 
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An equally informative picture is provided by the analysis of patent citations, by 
nationality of patent assignee. Patent citations provide a better measure of the 
technological and economic potential value of innovative activities than patent 
counts. Citations can in fact be used as a measure of the importance or impact of 
inventions and as a proxy of knowledge flows among patenting institutions. Widely 
cited patents tend to be “seminal” patents, i.e. key inventions on which further 
patent must refer to. Moreover, high citations rates have been shown to correlate 
with the economic value of patents. Thus, a high number of citations received by a 
given firm or country can be interpreted as a measure of the quality and relevance 
of its innovative activities
21
.  
Data reported in Table 17 sharpen the results obtained by looking at patent counts. 
The US dominance is stronge both in pharmaceuticals and in biotechnology, and 
in both fields citations to US patents increased over the two periods.  The share of 
citations to US patents is higher than the share of counts in the earlier Table, which 
suggests that on average US patents are relatively more important.  By and large, 
the share of citations for the European countries is similar or lower than the share 
of counts.  Only the UK shows a higher share for citations.  Germany, France and 
Italy all show a lower share for citations than for counts. Among the 25 institutions 
which have the largest number of highly cited patents, 11 are American, 3 each are 
British, Swiss, German and French, one is Japanese and one Danish. Moreover, 4 
are first generation biotechnology firms, and four are universities or public research 
centres.  
 
                                            
21
 Jaffe, Trajtenberg, Henderson, 1993; McMillan, Narin, Deeds, 2000.  
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Table 18 gives information on the geographical location of inventive activities by 
the 30 selected firms. Table 17 shows that: a) On average, the inventive activities 
of the European and American firms are more internationalised as compared to 
Japanese corporations; b) When they do not invent in their own country, French 
and German companies invent in the US – note in particular the high share of 
biotech inventions in the US by German companies as compared to pharma 
patents; c) the UK, but also the Swiss companies, do relatively little research in the 
their own country as compared to what they do in the US. Particularly, Swiss 
companies do a lot of their biotech research in the US; d) the US companies do few 
biotech patents in European laboratories, compared to the Europeans in the US 
(7.1% compared to generally higher than 10%).
22
  
 
                                            
22
 See Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000 for further details.  
Table 17:  
Shares in terms of Patent Citations, by Nationality of Assignee* 
Shares of Citations   
 Pharma % Biotech % 
Country 1978-
1988 
1987-
1997 
Total 1978-
1988 
1987-
1997 
Total 
Canada 1.21 1.55 1.45 0.83 1.65 1.32 
Denmark 0.91 0.87 0.88 1.45 2.73 2.21 
France 5.48 6.85 6.44 4.77 5.18 5.01 
Germany 12.86 8.59 9.85 7.58 6.87 7.16 
Italy 1.81 2.70 2.43 0.57 1.17 0.92 
Japan 17.37 12.36 13.84 16.56 11.77 13.72 
Spain 0.11 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.16 
Sweden 2.42 1.88 2.04 1.63 1.21 1.38 
Switzerland 4.02 2.98 3.29 4.17 5.12 4.73 
UK 9.48 10.98 10.54 8.08 8.57 8.37 
USA 44.33 51.02 49.04 54.16 55.61 55.02 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
* Corporate Headquarters. Source: O r calculations on European Patent Office. Data cleared from self-citati ns at the country and 
firm level. Source: European Patent Office-CESPRI database on European Patent Applications. 
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All in all, the evidence presented in this section shows that the relative position of 
the US as a locus of innovation has i creased over the past decade compared to 
Europe. Moreover, our overall picture suggests that Europe’s performance is 
comparatively worse in biotechnology.  
The aggregate picture, however, stems from differentiated trends across individual 
European countries. It is also important to notice that the American leadership 
seem to derive less from the superiority of individual corporations vis-à-vis their
European counterparts than from the presence of a larger number of innovative 
companies.  This can be seen from the larger number of US companies within the 
top corporations, from the higher R&D intensity of the US industry as a whole and, 
indirectly, from the data examined in Section II. Moreover, the American 
advantage appears to be linked to the more pronounc d le of the New 
Biotechnology Firms, and the universities as well, to research and innovative 
activities.  
Table 18: 
Top 30 Pharmaceutical Companies Worldwide -- Share of 1987-1996 European Patents 
Invented by Assignee from Country x in Region y 
 Region of invention 
Nationality 
of Assignee* 
EU 
Biotech 
EU 
Pharma 
JP 
Biotech 
JP 
Pharma 
Other 
Biotech 
Other 
Pharma 
USA 
Biotech 
USA 
Pharma 
Total 
Biotech 
Total 
Pharma 
France (2) 86.6 84.8 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.6 12.4 14.6 100.0 100.0 
Germ. (5) 80.4 95.2 0.2 1.0 1.5 1.2 17.8 2.6 100.0 100.0 
Japan (4) 1.7 4.5 96.4 93.5 0.0 0.1 1.9 1.8 100.0 100.0 
Sweden (1) 66.0 88.9 0.0 2.1 23.6 2.3 10.4 6.7 100.0 100.0 
Switz. (2) 44.4 71.2 5.1 2.5 0.8 0.8 49.7 25.5 100.0 100.0 
UK (2) 76.7 54.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.9 21.3 45.0 100.0 100.0 
USA (14) 7.1 16.6 1.2 2.1 1.2 2.6 90.4 78.7 100.0 100.0 
Total 36.7 51.7 8.7 7.4 1.5 1.6 53.1 39.2 100.0 100.0 
* Location of Headquarters. Source: Our calculations on European Patent Office 
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IV.3 Collaboration in Research, Markets for Technology, and Implications for 
Competitiveness  
As mentioned previously, the molecular biology revolution has entailed the 
adoption of new organisational forms of R&D, in particular a higher reliance on 
collaborations between firms, New Biotechnology Firms (NBFs) and universities.  
The explosion of technological opportunities and the relevance of pure scientific, 
academic research for innovative activities associated with the advent of molecular 
biology, has meant that no individual firm can now be able to control and master 
internally all the knowledge required to discover and develop a new drug
23
.  
Coupled with the establishment of property rights on such knowledge, all this has 
allowed the emergence and development of a vibrant market for technology. The 
ability to access and make efficient use of such network of collaborative relations 
and of the underlying market for technology has therefore become a crucial source 
of competitiveness.  
Our analysis confirms that in the Nineties collaborations have increased in all the 
countries.  In addition, we find that collaborations have increased in the phase of 
pre-clinical research relatively to the marketing stage
24
   
On this, Table 20, based on the PHID database at the University of Siena,  unravels 
major differences in firms’ research and licensing behaviour, focussing on seven 
major Countries (USA, UK, Switzerland, Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden) for 
1992 to 1998. 
The indicators presented in Table 20 are defined as the proportion of projects 
licensed in and out in a given phase of the R&D process, over the total number of 
projects developed in collaboration.  
                                            
23
 Powell et al., 1996.  
24
 See Gambardella, Orsenigo, Pammolli, 2000.  
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More precisely, Lp/L, L1-2/L, L3/L, Lr/L and Lm/L, indicate, respectively:  
· the proportion of projects that were licensed-in in Preclinical (Lp/L),  
· the proportion of projects that were licensed-in Phase 1-2 of Clinical 
Research (L1-2/L), 
· the proportion of projects that were licensed-in Phase 3 of Clinical 
Research (L3/L),  
· the proportion of projects that were licensed-duri g the Registration Phase 
(Lr/L), and, finally,  
· the proportion of projects that were licensed-aft r commercialisation 
(Marketing: Lm/L). 
Other indicators are then considered:  
· the ratio of licensed projects to in house projects (L/H),  
· the ratio of projects licensed in Preclinical to the projects developed in 
house (Lp/Hp), and  
· the ratio of licensed out projects in R&D to projects developed in house 
(LO/H). 
In synthesis, Table 20 shows that US firms have consistently over time the highest 
propensity to collaborate in the pre-clinical phase, whereas collaboration in 
marketing remain significant in the European countries.  Furthermore,US firms act 
more frequently as licensors (Originators) of new R&D projects as compared to 
the other European countries, which are typically licensees (Dev loper). Based on 
Table 20 it is possible to distinguish very clearly the behaviour of firms located in 
Countries like Italy and, to a lesser extent, Sweden, that have a high propensity to 
license-in in the latter phases of the R&D chain, from US, UK, and Swiss firms, 
that collaborate extensively also in the early stages of the R&D process.  
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Moreover, as it is shown in Table 19, the role of “Originators” of US (and 
Canadian) companies is linked to the disproportionate share of licences which 
involve – largely as licensors – NBFs, universities and other research centres as 
compared to the other major European countries (with the exception of the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden), and Japan.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19: 
R&D Projects, by Country and Type of Institution, 1990-199 
Lead Pharma DBFs Univ./Inst. 
 Num. Projects Num. Projects Num. Projects 
R&D Projects In-house Originated Developed 
USA 82 1710 313 920 112 421 3051 27.43 26.78 45.79 
Japan 137 1413 3 15 33 70 1498 37.12 21.16 41.72 
Germany 37 716 17 30 7 8 754 27.19 21.09 51.72 
United Kingdom 14 379 29 118 17 22 519 39.11 23.89 36.99 
France 24 347 23 58 9 22 427 25.53 19.44 55.04 
Switzerland 24 376 3 6 2 8 390 34.87 14.36 50.77 
Italy 45 272 3 12 6 7 291 27.49 20.27 52.23 
Spain 31 161 1 3 2 3 167 46.11 11.38 42.51 
South Korea 46 154 0 0 2 4 158 16.46 4.43 79.11 
Canada 7 16 32 95 8 13 124 20.16 33.06 46.77 
Netherlands 10 49 8 46 2 2 97 9.28 30.93 59.79 
Belgium 10 76 5 11 3 7 94 15.96 45.74 38.30 
Denmark 3 32 5 36 2 2 70 31.43 37.14 31.43 
Hungary 2 23 4 18 4 8 49 24.49 65.31 10.20 
Israel 9 31 1 1 5 13 45 15.56 17.78 66.67 
Australia 4 9 8 24 6 9 42 11.90 19.05 69.05 
Argentina 18 36 0 0 0 0 36 2.78 - 97.22 
Finland 4 20 1 3 0 0 23 21.74 26.09 52.17 
Czech Rep. 5 9 1 1 1 10 20 50.00 15.00 35.00 
Portugal 12 17 0 0 0 0 17 5.88 - 94.12 
Sweden 2 5 5 11 1 1 17 11.76 47.06 41.18 
Ireland 1 14 2 2 1 0 16 - 87.50 12.50 
Others* 97 104 3 3 46 51 158 22.15 10.13 67.72 
Total 624 5969 467 1413 269 681 8063 - - - 
*China, Russia, South Africa, Chile, Colombia, India, Austria, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, 
Slovenia, Turkey, Croatia, Latvia, New Zealand, Taiwan, Uruguay, Malaysia, Monaco, Perù, Singapore, Slovak Republic, 
Venezuela, Bulgaria, Hong Kong, Jordan, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Ukraine. Source: PHID, University of Siena 
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Table 20: Profiles of R&D Behaviour, Selected Countries, 1992-1998 
 N H L L/H Lp/L L1-2/L L3/L Lr/L Lm/L Lp/Hp LO/H 
USA            
1992 898 732 166 0.227 0.373 0.241 0.066 0.091 0.229 0.135 0.077 
1993 1132 911 221 0.242 0.416 0.24 0.063 0.086 0.195 0.154 0.09 
1994 1378 1104 274 0.248 0.453 0.219 0.058 0.078 0.193 0.176 0.096 
1995 1834 1497 337 0.225 0.454 0.22 0.06 0.083 0.184 0.148 0.11 
1996 2250 1832 418 0.186 0.474 0.206 0.074 0.086 0.16 0.152 0.123 
1997 2257 1743 514 0.295 0.475 0.202 0.078 0.09 0.156 0.266 0.178 
1998 2353 1763 590 0.336 0.489 0.206 0.069 0.087 0.148 0.244 0.255 
Switzerland            
1992 216 184 32 0.301 0.176 0.196 0.039 0.098 0.491 0.038 0.106 
1993 223 187 36 0.284 0.180 0.200 0.040 0.080 0.500 0.026 0.079 
1994 248 205 43 0.251 0.173 0.195 0.021 0.086 0.525 0.034 0.076 
1995 241 197 44 0.223 0.162 0.186 0.023 0.069 0.560 0.04 0.057 
1996 235 192 43 0.223 0.181 0.204 0.045 0.045 0.525 0.036 0.050 
1997 229 183 46 0.209 0.162 0.279 0.046 0.046 0.467 0.043 0.019 
1998 226 176 50 0.192 0.138 0.333 0.055 0.055 0.419 0.051 0.016 
UK            
1992 230 193 37 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.46 0.06 0.01 
1993 488 217 41 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.51 0.07 0.01 
1994 258 212 110 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.54 0.07 0.02 
1995 334 275 150 0.21 0.27 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.46 0.06 0.02 
1996 380 313 177 0.21 0.24 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.46 0.09 0.03 
1997 442 362 211 0.20 0.34 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.40 0.13 0.05 
1998 468 376 92 0.24 0.38 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.35 0.16 0.06 
Germany            
1992 334 283 51 0.180 0.117 0.059 0.039 0.294 0.491 0.033 0.021 
1993 381 321 60 0.187 0.150 0.066 0.050 0.266 0.468 0.046 0.018 
1994 419 353 66 0.187 0.121 0.060 0.045 0.272 0.502 0.039 0.017 
1995 461 361 100 0.277 0.130 0.060 0.060 0.230 0.52 0.065 0.027 
1996 488 363 125 0.344 0.152 0.056 0.064 0.240 0.488 0.104 0.033 
1997 476 339 137 0.404 0.167 0.065 0.065 0.226 0.477 0.139 0.038 
1998 482 326 156 0.478 0.198 0.064 0.083 0.211 0.444 0.209 0.043 
France            
1992 206 171 35 0.204 0.171 0.085 0.085 0.142 0.517 0.057 0.017 
1993 234 193 41 0.212 0.195 0.073 0.073 0.121 0.538 0.073 0.015 
1994 259 211 48 0.227 0.166 0.083 0.062 0.166 0.523 0.067 0.023 
1995 287 230 57 0.247 0.175 0.052 0.070 0.210 0.493 0.084 0.021 
1996 289 228 61 0.267 0.163 0.049 0.065 0.229 0.494 0.086 0.022 
1997 264 199 65 0.326 0.138 0.046 0.061 0.215 0.540 0.096 0.030 
1998 281 105 70 0.331 0.157 0.042 0.057 0.214 0.530 0.104 0.033 
1998 295 207 88 0.425 0.284 0.079 0.045 0.170 0.420 0.247 0.063 
Sweden            
1992 23 17 6 0.353 - - 0.166 0.500 0.334 - - 
1993 28 21 7 0.333 - - 0.142 0.428 0.430 - - 
1994 32 24 8 0.166 - 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.375 - 0.041 
1995 34 25 9 0.360 - 0.111 0.111 0.333 0.445 - 0.040 
1996 39 27 12 0.444 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.416 0.335 0.037 0.037 
1997 48 31 17 0.548 0.117 0.294 0.059 0.294 0.236 0.064 0.032 
1998 49 29 20 0.689 0.200 0.250 0.050 0.250 0.250 0.136 0.035 
Italy            
1992 103 70 33 0.471 0.060 0.091 0.030 0.151 0.668 0.055 0.014 
1993 125 83 42 0.336 0.048 0.071 0.023 0.214 0.644 0.048 0.012 
1994 150 102 48 0.320 0.041 0.062 0.020 0.208 0.669 0.019 0.019 
1995 168 111 57 0.513 0.035 0.052 0.070 0.193 0.650 0.018 0.025 
1996 179 120 59 0.491 0.034 0.051 0.067 0.203 0.645 0.016 0.029 
1997 187 121 66 0.545 0.060 0.045 0.060 0.197 0.938 0.080 0.035 
1998 178 111 67 0.603 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.194 0.629 0.090 0.040 
Source: PHID, University of Siena 
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This is an important point, as it suggests that one major difference between the US 
and Europe is really the presence in the US of an industry of technology suppliers, 
both new biotechnology firms and universities. In short, Europe and the US may 
not look too different if one looks individually at the large drug multinationals; but 
they do look differnt if one looks at the organisation of the industry.  In the US 
there is not only a larger number of big innovative companies, but also a higher 
supply of new technologies and an extensive vertical specialisation between an 
industry that is specialised in the “exploration” of new technologies and innovation 
opportunities, and an industry that is specialised in their “exploitation”.
25
   
As argued by several authors, this organisation of the industry can be highly 
conducive to innovation performance, as it exploits the comparative advantages of 
larger and smaller firms in the exploration and exploitation phases.
26
   
Given this, the European research system need not only to be strengthened in terms 
of its ability to produce more and better research, but also to exploit its innovation 
potential by translating this potential into economic performance. For example, 
today the biotech industry in the US is said to account for 10% of the total US sales 
of pharmaceutical products, and tohave produced more than a hundred thousands 
specialised jobs between 1984-19 4 (on average seventy-five jobs per company)
27
.  
A recent study estimated that in California biotech companies linked to star 
scientists provided a sizable contribution in terms of new employment 
                                            
25
 See March, 1991.  
26
 See for instance Arrow, 1983; Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2000; Arora, Gambardella, Pammolli, 
Riccaboni, 2000.   
27
 See Scriabine, 1999.  
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opportunities
28
.  In addition, over the past 10-20 years, some of the US biotech 
firms – e.g. Amgen, Centocor, Biogen, Chiron, Genentech, Genzyme, Immunex – 
have become leading producers both in the US and to a good extent abroad.  These 
companies produce a fair number of products, some of which account for a few 
hundreds millions dollars in annual sales.  At the same time, as we shall see below, 
biotech and similar companies selling drug research tools and technologies are a 
new important phenomenon of the US industry.  Apart from providing new 
contributions in terms of industry growth, sales and employment, the rise of 
technology specialists in new areas witness the vitality of this process, and its 
potential for new economic spins.  Finally, the intensive licensing out of 
technologies or products by the US biotech companies and related technology 
suppliers is likely to imply a steady flow of revenues in terms of royalty rates.  This 
provides further accounts for the opportunities that can be created by the rise and 
growth of a dynamic and innovative industry.  
In sum, the creation of an active European industry that thrives on innovation 
opportunities is likely to mean less for the fortunes and the competitiveness of the 
established European pharmaceutical companies.  But it is likely to imply far more 
for the growth, the performance, and the vitality of the European pharmaceutical 
industry and environment as a whole. 
In addition, Tables 19 and 20 confirm both the role of US firms as originators of
new technologies and the importance of the market for technology within the US, 
as a powerful tool of transmission of knowledge across countries. 
Although domestic sources of knowledge remain important, companies tend to get 
a large share of licences from the US, especially in the pre-clinical research phase, 
and much less so in downstream stages.  
                                            
28
 See Zucker, Darby, Armstrong, 1998.  
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This reinforces the point that the US feed both domestic and foreign companies, 
while European and Japanese firms tend to tap North American knowledge, much 
more than the other way around and even more than the domestic sources.  As a 
result, rather than globalisation of research, we observe a process of concentration 
of research into North America.  
Related important evidence comes from recent ongoing research on the relative 
perfonrmances of in-house vs. licensed in R&D projects
29
.  Tables 21 and 22 show 
that licensed projects have a higher probability of success, and this is so for all the 
countries and phases of clinical trials. At the same time, US companies show a 
higher probability of success in all the phases of clinical trials. This stems from a 
higher probability of success of in-h use projects, while the US probability of 
success from licensed projects is aligned with the probability of success from 
licensed projects of companies coming from any other country. To put it in a 
nutshell, participation to division of innovative labour and to markets for 
technology can allow companies to get access to external knowledge and to 
increase the productivity of their research.  As a result, markets for technology can 
smooth the competitive differences across firms.  While in-house development 
implies a different probability of success for companies from different nationality, 
in the case of licensed compounds the probability of success is not affected by the 
nationality of the firms. Internal differences in competitiveness, which depend on 
firm-specific capabilities, can be vanished by the fact that companies rely on 
common sources of technology, which they acquir  from specialist technology 
suppliers.
30
  
                                            
29
 See Arora, Gambardella, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000.  See also Pammolli, Riccaboni, Baio, 2000. 
30
 See Arora, Gambardella, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000.  
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Coupled with the observation that US firms have higher propensity to using 
licenses than European or Japanese firms, these results bear some interesting 
implications for the analysis of competitive advantages in drug R&D
31
:  
i) US firms cumulate a higher ability of developing compounds in-house with a 
greater reliance on licenses, which is a more productive mode of innovating. 
Thus, the US competitiveness in drug innovation appears to be the “sum” of 
these two effects – better in-house capabilities and more effective use of the 
market for technology;  
ii) European firms lag behind their US counterparts in terms of their in-house 
capabilities and, moreover, of the extent of their use of the market for 
technology. Considering that licensed compounds have a higher probability 
of success, this implies that European companies should rely more on the 
market for technology, in order to partially compensate for their lower in-
house capabilities. 
 
                                            
31
 See Arora, Gambardella, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2000.  
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Table 21: 
Licensing Agreements in R&D 
Out In   
Preclinical 300 (62.4%) 
USA 
132 (27.4%) 
Europe 
49 (10.2%) 
Japan 
350 (73.4%) USA 84.3% 50.0% 40.8% 
96 (20.1%) Europe 10.7% 41.7% 6.1% 
31 (6,5%) Japan 2.3% 4.5% 34.7% 
Clinical III 80  (45.5%) USA 
57  (32.4%) 
Europe 
(2.1%) 
Japan 
98 (55.7%) USA 67.5% 54.3% 33.3% 
52 (29.5%) Europe 27.5% 38.6% 20.5% 
26 (14.8%) Japan 5.0% 7.1% 46.2% 
Marketing 478 (29.3%) USA 
820 (50.3%) 
Europe 
331 (20.4%) 
Japan 
503 (30.9%) USA 42.3% 23.9% 31.7% 
763 (46.8%) Europe 38.1% 56.1% 36.6% 
363 (22.3) Japan 19.6% 20.0% 31.7% 
Source: Our calculations from PHID, University of Siena 
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At the end of this section it is important to notice that the potential levelling effect 
of markets for technologies notwithstanding, the access to the network of 
collaborations and to the market for technology in pharmaceuticals is not 
unrestricted. Particularly, the network of collaborative relationships itself tends to 
consolidate and to become increasingly hierarchical. Indeed, the network has been 
expanding over time, mainly through the continuous entry of new, increasingly 
Table 22: 
Success and Failure Rates of Licensed vs. In-House Drug Compounds (*) 
 Preclinical/Clinical I Clinical I/II Clinical II/III 
 Failure Success Total Failure Success Total Failure Success Total 
Total          
In-House 
2038 
(58.1) 
1470 
(41.9) 
3508 
(100) 
355 
(20.6) 
1268 
(79.4) 
1623 
(100) 
428 
(38.0) 
698 
(62.0) 
1126 
(100) 
Licensed 192 (38.2) 
311 
(61.8) 
503 
(100) 
36 
(9.4) 
348 
(90.6) 
384 
(100) 
49 
(14.3) 
293 
(85.7) 
342 
(100) 
Total 2230 (55.6) 
1781 
(44.4) 
4011 
(100) 
391 
(19.5) 
1616 
(80.5) 
2007 
(100) 
477 
(32.5) 
991 
(67.5) 
1468 
(100) 
US firms          
In-House 849 (54.8) 
700 
(45.2) 
1549 
(100) 
108 
(17.0) 
528 
(83.0) 
636 
(100) 
126 
(33.2) 
254 
(66.8) 
380 
(100) 
Licensed 
129 
(39.4) 
198 
(60.6) 
327 
(100) 
21 
(9.7) 
195 
(90.3) 
216 
(100) 
22 
(13.9) 
136 
(86.1) 
158 
(100) 
Total 978 (52.1) 
898 
(47.9) 
1876 
(100) 
129 
(15.1) 
723 
(84.9) 
852 
(100) 
148 
(27.5) 
390 
(72.5) 
538 
(100) 
European firms         
In-House 764 (61.6) 
477 
(28.4) 
1241 
(100) 
176 
(28.9) 
433 
(71.1) 
609 
(100) 
189 
(40.4) 
279 
(59.6) 
468 
(100) 
Licensed 35 (36.8) 
60 
(63.2) 
95 
(100) 
10 
(11.9) 
74 
(88.1) 
84 
(100) 
19 
(20.1) 
73 
(79.9) 
92 
(100) 
Total 799 (59.8) 
537 
(40.2) 
1336 
(100) 
186 
(26.8) 
507 
(73.2) 
693 
(100) 
208 
(37.1) 
352 
(62.9) 
560 
(100) 
Japanese firms        
In-House 327 (61.8) 
202 
(28.2) 
529 
(100) 
55 
(19.0) 
235 
(81.0) 
290 
(100) 
89 
(39.9) 
134 
(60.1) 
223 
(100) 
Licensed 8 (19.5) 
33 
(80.5) 
41 
(100) 
3 
(4.6) 
62 
(95.4) 
65 
(100) 
8 
(11.6) 
61 
(88.4) 
69 
(100) 
Total 335 (58.8) 
235 
(41.2) 
570 
(100) 
58 
(16.3) 
297 
(83.7) 
355 
(100) 
97 
(33.2) 
195 
(66.8) 
292 
(100) 
Source: Our calculations from PHID, University of Siena (*) Drug compounds developed in-house vs acquired through licenses in 
Phase I, II, or III of clinical research by the top 100 pharmaceutical corporations, worldwide. Percentages in parenthesis are 
conditional probabilities of success and failure. 
  
 
 
 
 
53 
specialised, US firms collaborating with large incumbents. Despite this growth, 
however, the network tends to consolidate around a rather stable core of 
companies. This core is composed by large incumbents and early entrants, who act 
as integrators of differentiated and strongly specialised fragments of knowledge. 
This suggests the existence of first-mover advantages even in the network of 
collaborations, which becomes increasingly difficult to enter as time goes by
32
.  
IV.4 Drug Research Tools: Another Largely US Phenomenon? 
The state of European competitiveness in pharmaceutical innovation is also 
reflected by the ability of the EU industry to develop and participate in the 
development of the new R&D tools and general-purpose technologies (GPTs) that 
have been introduced into the industry since the beginning of the Ni eties. GPTs 
have enabled increasing levels of vertical specialisation and division of innovative 
labour in drug discovery, not differently from other high-tech industrial sectors
33
.  
During the Nineties, a set of generic research technologies has been developed in 
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, from polymerase chain reaction (PCR), to 
protein structure modelling, rapid computer based drug assay and testing, 
recombinant chemistry techniques, drug delivery systems, chemical separation and 
purification techniques that allow researchers to screen thousands of potentially 
promising compounds. 
In short, the recent evolution of research strategies and heuristics in pharmaceutical 
R&D can be characterised by discerning between two main, coexisting search 
regimes.  The first regime is based on biological hypotheses and molecules that 
tend to be specific to given fields of application (specialised technologies), while 
                                            
32
 See Orsenigo, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 1998 and 2000.  
33
 See Helpman, 1998.  
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the second regime is characterised by the emergence of new generic tools (general 
purpose technologies). 
In the case of specialised research hypotheses and molecules, the characterisation 
of biological targets and the corresponding design/experimentation of each new 
drug tends to require individual analysis. Lessons learned from the design and 
experimentation of one biological hypothesis/molecule cannot be immediately 
transferred to other biological domains, in order to develop other classes of drugs. 
Conversely, general purpose technologies are in principle applicable to multiple 
biological targets and diseases.  
As for this Report, it is important to say that the two regimes are characterised by 
different investment and risk profiles. In particular, firms specialised in general-
purpose research technologies have access to a larger market, both in terms of areas 
of application and partnering institutions. At the same time, they act in market 
segments that have significantly lower short-t m risks, R&D costs, and capital 
requirements compared with those existing for integrated, product oriented, firms
34
.
Aggregate data for the three major research technologies of combinatorial 
chemistry, genomics, and high throughput screening are presented in Figures 5 and 
6. While the American dominance seems to be indisputable, in the last years 
European companies from the UK and, later on, from Germany, have entered the 
industry. In particular, German firms that have entered the industry have been 
moving away from the fully-integrated, expensive, and risky model of the first 
generation’ NBFs. Instead, they have focussd n the development of business 
models based around the provision of technology services and intermediate 
outputs.  
While these evidences could reveal a basis for a certain degree of technological 
specialisation of European start-ups in markets for technologies, the new drug 
                                            
34
 See Casper, Kettler, 2000.  
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discovery GPTs can quickly become commodities, with increasing levels of 
substitution and price competition
35
. For this reason, in order to evaluate the 
sustainability of any strategy of specialisation in the new GPTs, it important to 
notice that “to grow, platform technology firms must move relatively quickly into 
new technologies or towards discovering their own targets for development using 
patented technology”
36
. 
 
                                            
35
 See Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella, 2000.  
36
 See Casper, Kettler, 2000, p. 34. 
Figure 5: 
Agreements in General Purpose Research Technologies  
(Combinatorial Chemistry, Genomics, Highthroughput Screening) 
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Source: PHID, University of Siena 
*First five months. 
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Figure 6: 
Agreements in General Purpose Research Technologies, Shares 1991-2000* 
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V. The Role of Competition  
Apart from leading drug multinationals, and some new biotech or technology-
based companies, Europe fares a large number of low R&D intensive, “national”, 
small pharmaceutical companies.  These operate exclusively in their protected 
domestic markets, and are characterised by low R&D and capital intensity, and 
poor innovative capabilities. 
The presence of these firms suggests that patterns of competition in many 
European countries do not provide either a strong “carrot” or a strong “stick” (or 
neither), favouring the adoption of innovation- and international-oriented 
companies’ strategies. On the contrary, European regulated and fragmented 
environments allow for the survival of these producers.  
It is well known that patterns of competition and firms behaviour in 
pharmaceuticals are influenced by institutio al variables, like the structure of 
health care systems, price and product approval regulations, and legislation on 
property rights. How do these variables influence innovation and welfare is a 
difficult and controversial issue. The literature, however seems to converge in 
arguing that competitive mechanisms associated with stringent regulatory 
environments for the approval of new drugs and competitive dynamics on the final 
markets tend to promote innovation in the pharmaceutical industry
37
.  
On this, it is important to notice that the significant role of the EU notwithstanding, 
healthcare provision and legislation in Europe is the responsibility of individual 
member States. European national healthcare systems are hugely diversified in 
terms of the way they are organised and financed, ranging from national health 
schemes funded out of general taxes (the UK-Italy-Spain model), to mandated 
personal insurance with pluralist providers (the Germany-France-Netherlands 
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model). While “these variations reflect the different social values, ethics, and levels 
of wealth across Europe”
38
, they constitute an impediment to the creation of a 
unified European market, with all its implied consequences – conomies of scale, 
higher competition, etc.  Moreover, they are likely to contribute to generate 
inconsistencies, inefficient uses of resources, uneven standards of medical care, 
and distortions in the functioning of markets.  
This Report does not review neither the specific barriers to integration that are still 
in place, nor the extensive EU legislation aimed at creating a single market in 
pharmaceuticals, with special reference to areas such as patent protection, 
biotechnology inventions, industrial manufacturing, product testing, market 
authorisations, labeling and advertising.  
Instead, based on specific empirical evidences, the Report focuses on some issues 
that are directly relevant for industrial competitiveness, seeking to identify a set of 
criteria against which the definition of specific measures by member States can  
judged.  
Given our interest on the low R&D intensive segment of the market, some features 
of the off-patent segment (more than 50 % of the market) have been addressed, by 
means of an extensive comparative analysis of industry structure and, moreove , 
the nature and intensity of competition preceding and following patent expiry. Five 
major markets, characterised by strong differences in terms of regulatory regimes 
and generic products penetration, were selected (USA, UK, France, Germany, 
Italy)
39
.  
                                                                                                         
37
 See Thomas, 1994; Danzon, 1996; Helms, 1996.  
38
 EUI, 1999, p. 46.  
39
 See Pammolli, Magazzini, Riccaboni, 2000.  
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The most important chemical entities whose patents expired from 1986 through 
1997 have been selected, coming to a sample of more than 60 molecules per 
country (with the exception of Italy, for which only 20 molecules of known dates 
of patent expiry were available). A broad concept of market competition would 
involve the chemical entity and the market composed of therapeutic alternatives. 
For this Report a narrower context, the chemical entity market, is used because an 
Original drug directly competes with Multiple Source Drugs (MSDs) within a 
given chemical entity market
40
. In fact, the. relevant data set includes information 
on all Original and Multiple Source drugs in a selected chemical entity, permitting 
inclusion of all drugs within a chemical entity (gener c name)
41
.  
Table 23 and Figures 7, 8, and 9 present some descriptive results of the analysis. 
While we not focus here on price comparisons across countries
42
, some elevant 
results for the analysis of patterns of industrial competitiveness can be outlined: 
                                            
40
 When substitution laws allow pharmacists to substitute multiple source drugs for the Original, 
substitution in the retail setting usually occurs within the same chemical entity, rather than among 
therapeutic alternatives. In addition, multiple source competition is primarily targeted at the Original 
rather than the therapeutic market. Therefore, effects of substitution among chemical entities within 
the broader therapeutically equivalent market are not taken int  account. Price differentiation of one 
dosage form versus another for a specific product is not examined. Data are aggregated across all 
strengths, dosage forms, and packing sizes for all variables of each drug. Specific data for each 
manufacturer’s sales in US dollars and number of units sold are pulled for each drug, strength, and 
dosage form. 
41
 Data sources for the study include: the IMS Pharmacy and Hospital databases, information on 
patent expirations, and a self- dministrated questionnaire used to collect primary data on drug entity 
characteristics. For the IMS International data sets, data for each manufacturer’s sales in local 
currency, US dollars and number of units sold in five major countries (USA, UK, Germany, France, 
and Italy) were extracted. The data set includes quarterly data from the first quarter of 1986 through 
the fourth quarter of 1998. 
42
 See Danzon, 1996.  
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a) There are strong differences across countries in terms of extent of generic 
penetration (see Table 23) and intensity of competition after patent expiry. 
Systems that rely on free or semi-fre  prices and on comptition-based 
mechanisms (USA and, since the exclusion of patented drugs from the reference 
pricing system in 1996, Germany; UK) do experience a significant degree of 
competition and mobility of market shares after patent expiry. On the contrary, 
systems that rely on price fixing (Italy, France) experience a significant degree 
of stability in firms market shares over time, irrespectively of patent expiry (See 
Figure 7).  
b) As it is shown by the boxplots representing the median (black bar) and the 
dispersion of price indexes relative to products based on any given molecule in 
the 24 quarters that follow patent expiry (see Figure 8), systems that rely more 
on competition are characterized by the introduction of low-price products. On 
the contrary, systems that rely on administered prices are unable to replicate th
performance of private markets in the introduction of appropriate selective 
mechanisms and pressures on price levels. In fact, both a significant stability of 
prices over time and a lower variance of prices for products based on a given 
molecule at given points in time are observed. 
c) As it is shown in Figure 9, systems that rely on competition promote a clear 
distinction between firms that act as innovators and firms that act as imitators 
after patent expiry. To put it in a nutshell, Original products can enjoy premium 
prices and exclusivity profits under patent protection, and face fierce price 
competition after patent expiry. On the contrary, systems that rely on 
administered prices nurture strategies of pre-emptive brand proliferation and 
horizontal differentiation by imitative brand name products well before patent 
expiry (as an extreme case, see the data on the Italian market in Figure 9).  
All in all, these findings give support to the view that, irrespectively of any 
difference in terms of existing financial sources and organisational solutions, the 
European environment should be characterised by a larger diffusion of innovative 
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management methods
43
, and by higher levels of market-b sed competition, to begin 
with, in the off-patent segment of the market.  
As for industrial policy and competitiveness issues, an increased market 
competition in the off-patent segment of the market can contribute to foster 
efficiency and to design adequate incentives to innovate within the European 
environment, promoting patterns of industrial restructuration and selection and, 
moreover, allowing higher prices and returns on investment for innovative products 
that are still on patent
44
.  
Incidentally, a stronger reliance on competition mechanisms would induce a 
restructuration of vertical relationships within distribution channels, targeting  drug 
distribution costs as an important area for productivity gains. In many European 
countries, distribution margins for wholesalers and pharmacists are still fixed by 
law, in general as a fraction of the final price. A higher reliance on competition-
based mechanisms and regulatory strategies could enable the introduction of a 
higher degree of competition within distribution systems. In particular, together 
with a higher reliance on negotiation procedures targeted to wholesalers and 
pharmacists, the diffusion of cost-effective ways of dispensing drugs could be 
encouraged, relying on mail-order pharmacies and on the potential gains in 
productivity that are associated with the new Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs). 
 
 
 
                                            
43
 See GAO, 2000.  
44
 See also Jacobzone, 2000.  
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Table 23:  
Shares of National Markets, by Segments (Local Currencies) 
UK 1995 % 1996 % 1997 % 1998 % 1999 % 
Total 3079925 100.0 3418347 100.0 3717642 100.0 4020721 100.0 4393304 100.0 
Original Brands 2054281 66.7 2244111 65.6 2354743 63.3 2479768 61.7 2710701 61.7 
Licensed Brands 295382 9.6 352663 10.3 443882 11.9 543888 13.5 637844 14.5 
Patent NA 224990 7.3 234525 6.9 242357 6.5 243468 6.1 254009 5.8 
Unbranded 505273 16.4 587048 17.2 676660 18.2 753597 18.7 790751 18.0 
Germany           
Total 16153087 100.0 17303736 100.0 17373555 100.0 18715431 100.0 20700206 100.0 
Original Brands 6616472 41.0 7115339 41.1 7345085 42.3 8247688 44.1 9370111 45.3 
Licensed Brands 2521735 15.6 2792930 16.1 2822032 16.2 3093478 16.5 3475739 16.8 
Patent NA 3059322 18.9 3201668 18.5 3082150 17.7 3164577 16.9 3243271 15.7 
Unbranded 3955558 24.5 4193800 24.2 4124288 23.7 4209689 22.5 4611084 22.3 
France           
Total 54116334 100.0 56464471 100.0 59441833 100.0 63165381 100.0 66307342 100.0 
Original Brands 30946406 57.2 31833518 56.4 32922120 55.4 35489372 56.2 37887996 57.1 
Licensed Brands 10521138 19.4 11596251 20.5 12812585 21.6 13695996 21.7 14338627 21.6 
Patent NA 9007638 16.6 9129428 16.2 9325357 15.7 9297699 14.7 9137431 13.8 
Unbranded 3641153 6.7 3905274 6.9 4381770 7.4 4682315 7.4 4943288 7.5 
Italy           
Total 9458883 100.0 10467499 100.0 11344110 100.0 12224672 100.0 13539132 100.0 
Original Brands 4503552 47.6 5018454 47.9 5470191 48.2 5850940 47.9 6566792 48.5 
Licensed Brands 2627876 27.8 2859136 27.3 3155605 27.8 3507939 28.7 3934993 29.1 
Other Brands 1287527 13.6 1485288 14.2 1603394 14.1 1717773 14.1 1883483 13.9 
Patent NA 985623 10.4 1044362 10.0 1042953 9.2 1069730 8.8 1070524 7.9 
Unbranded 54304 0.6 60259 0.6 71966 0.6 78291 0.6 83340 0.6 
Source: IMS International 
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Figure 7: 
Market Shares after Patent Expiry, Selected Countries 
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Source: Pammolli, Magazzini, Riccaboni, 2000 
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Figure 8:  
Price Indexes after Patent Expiry, Selected Countries 
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Figure 9:  
Number of Products per Molecule, Selected Countries 
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VI. Institutional Determinants of Industrial Competitiveness 
The evidences discussed so far show, among other things, that North America has 
become the main locus of innovation in pharmaceuticals, to wh h Eur pean 
companies turn to get knowledge.  This may have different implications, and one 
may even suggest different readings of this phenomenon. 
For example, it could be argued that the situation is indeed worrisome, in spite of 
the fact that the competitiveness of the European industry in sales has not worsened 
as much as its competitiveness in innovation.   Advocates of this view could argue 
that it’s only because of the time needed to bring new drugs to the final market that 
Europe’s competitiveness has not deteriorated severely over the past decade. In 
fact, the analysis of the dynamics on the R&D side reveals that the gap with the US 
is becoming large, especially in biotechnology and in the most innovative, 
globalised, profitable, and best selling drugs, i.e. at the frontier of innovation. 
By contrast, one could argue that the problem may be not so severe for the larger 
European companies, as long as the more internationalised European drug 
companies succeed in tapping the US knowledge and get into the sources of new 
products and technological competencies overseas.  
In any case, as suggested by our earlier discussion on this point, the problem is 
severe for  the competitiveness of the European environment as a whole.  
In particular, the observed concentration of research and innovation in the USA is 
worrying because Europe risks to be relegated into the fringe of the industry, 
surviving and even thriving through imitation, generics, marketing, but giving up a 
large share of the value added and becoming dependent on the USA for the 
development of new products.  
Most notably, the inability to develop an industry of technology specialists, 
coupled with the persistence of a fringe of national firms which – especially in 
some European countries – are not innovative and protected from competition, can 
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ultimately give rise to a system which may loose significant opportunities for 
growth as well as for promoting qualified, research-based employment.  
As always in the case of sectoral and national systems of innovation
45
, several 
factors have interacted to produce trends like the ones we are assessing here, and 
these factors have acted at different levels.  Thus, especially if one examines these 
issues in terms of long run trends and perspectives, one cannot underestimate the 
role of structural policies in education, science and technology, regulation, labour, 
patent law, taxation; the institutional settings, in terms of legal and financial 
institutions, professional bodies, intermediating institutions, corporate governance 
rules; the industry; companies within the industry. 
According to this Report, four sets of variables are particularly relevant in the 
specific context of the pharmaceutical industry: 1) The size and structure of the 
biomedical education and research systems; 2) Some basic institutions governing 
labour markets for skilled researchers and managers, as well as corporate 
governance and finance; 3) Intellectual property rights and patent law; 4) The 
nature and intensity of competition on the final market.  In the sections that follow 
we shall analyse each of these issues in turn.  
VI.1 Education and Research in Biomedical Innovation Systems 
There is little question that the sheer amount of resources devoted to biomedical 
research in the USA in the post-war era goes a long way to explain the American 
leadership in life sciences.   
Both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that this spending has had a 
significant effect on the productivity of those large US firms that were able to take 
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advantage of it
46
. Public funding of biomedical research also increased dramatically 
in Europe in the post-war period, but total spending did not even approach 
American levels. As a consequence, and despite the existence of centres of absolute 
excellence, the overall quantity and quality of scientific research lagged behind in 
Europe. In turn, this created a vicious circle, with a significant drain of human and 
financial resources from Europe to the USA, which has contributed to further 
strengthen the American advat ge.  
Jointly with the levels of funding, other factors are likely to have played an 
important role. In fact, the institutional structure of biomedical research evolved 
quite differently in Continental Europe as opposed to the USA (and partly to the 
UK). First, the structure of the funding system and the strategies of the funding 
agencies are crucially important. In the USA, most of the funding is administered 
through the NIH, with: a) a substantial integration between the production of 
biological knowledge on the nature and mechanisms of human diseases, clinical 
research, medical practice, and the discovery and development of new therapeutic 
treatments; b) a significant support towards basic or fundamental science in 
universities and public research centres, widely disseminated through publication 
in the refereed literature. Moreover, the American system is characterised by a 
variety of sources of funding and selection mechanisms, which complement the 
role of the NIH and act – always starting from scientific excellence – according to 
different allocative principles
47
. All in all, the US research system achieves 
efficiency through competition among research units. At the same time, it allows 
diversity to be explored and institutional flexibility to be achieved. 
In Europe, funding has tended to be administered mainly at the national level, with 
strongly differentiated approaches and wide differences across countries. This is 
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likely to have hindered the development of a critical mass, especially in smaller 
countries. In many cases, resources have either been spread among a large number 
of “small” laboratories, or they have been excessively concentrated in the few 
available centres of excellence. Funding coming from the various European 
programmes has only partially changed the situation
48
. The absolute size and the 
higher degree of integration of the American research system, as opposed to the 
fragmented collection of national systems in Europe constitutes a fundamental 
difference. 
Moreover, biomedical research in Europe has been less integrated with teaching. 
At the same time, within medical schools in Continental Europe, medical research 
has had a somewhat marginal role as compared to patient care, inducing a hiatus 
between clinical practice and training in molecular biology .  
The relevance of the research-teac ing nexus in favouring high quality scientific 
research and its integration with industrial research can hardly be underrated. In 
particular, the diffusion of molecular biology into general training in many 
European countries is a relatively recent phenomenon as compared to the USA and 
it has only recently become a standard part of the curriculum of pharmacologists, 
pathologists and medical consultants. Research has tended to be confined into 
highly specialised laboratories in universities and especially in public research 
centres, with little interaction with teaching, medical practice, and industrial 
research.  
Also for these reasons, large European companies have been in general more 
sluggish in adopting molecular biology as compared to their American competitors. 
Particularly, the European firms have remained for a longer time more closely 
linked to the cognitive and organisational procedures that governed research when 
chemistry constituted the main knowledge base.  
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This has produced a vicious circle that has made the entry of the new 
biotechnology companies more difficult.  In the first place, there is evidence 
showing that rates of formation of new start-ups are strongly correlated with the 
strength of University and public research institutes in the underlying sciences
49
. 
Moreover, given the delay in the adoption of molecular biology by the large 
companies in Europe, new prospective start-ups lacked an essential source of 
survival and growth, through the establishment of collaborative agreements. In the 
absence of such competencies, the large European companies turned to the 
American scientific and technological base to tap and absorb the new requisite 
competencies during their catching-up process. Indeed, the evidence produced in 
this Report, as well as several studies, show that large European multinationals 
have tended to establish agreements with research centres and biotech companies 
in the USA rather than in Europe
50
. Finally, given the fast rates of progress of the 
scientific and technical knowledge, European start-ups would be often pre-empted 
by American companies. 
In sum, the organisational structure and the internal institutional diversity of the 
public research system in the USA has promoted (both in terms of incentives and in 
terms of organisational capabilities) the commercial exploitation of academic 
research, mainly through the formation of new, specialised companies. The 
flexibility of the American academic system, the high mobility of the scentific
labour market and, in general, the social, institutional and legal context that made it 
relatively straightforward for leading academic scientists to become involved with 
commercial firms, have been major factors in the development of the new 
industry
51
.  
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The willingness to exploit the results of academic research commercially also 
distinguishes the US environment from Europe. This willingness has been 
strengthened since the late 1970s and the passage of the Bayh-D le Act, nd the 
resulting role of universities as seedbeds of entrepreneurship has also been 
extremely important in the take-off th  biotechnology industry
52
.  
In contrast, links between the academy and industry – particularly the ability to 
freely exchange personnel – have been weaker in Europe. Indeed, the efforts of 
several European governments were targeted to the strengthening of industry-
University collaboration. Thus, one observes a mushrooming of initiatives all 
across Europe aiming at establishing stronger links between industry and 
universities and to encourage a more entrepreneurial attitude by universities, rather 
than the mobility of personnel or the ease for university researchers to establish or 
participate in companies. 
At the same time, policies have been targeted mainly to the set-up f specific 
organisational devices to manage technology transfer, like science and technology 
parks or other agencies for technology transfer.  These initiatives have taken a wide 
variety of forms and show a mixed record in their performance and it has b en only 
in very recent times that symptoms of the diffusion of a different attitude have 
emerged. In some cases, the presence of intermediary institutions has paradoxically 
increased the distance between University and industry, introducing an additional 
layer in the relationship instead of creating flexible mechanisms that are not 
burdened by all sorts of bureaucratic structures and requirements.  
The US experience would then suggest that a flexible environment whereby 
academic researchers can more easily move into the development of companies is 
more conducive to the raise of new research-ba d firms and to the corresponding 
technology-based industry.  Yet, the US system is not immune from an important 
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shortcoming. As Paul David and Partha Dasgupta have argued, this system can 
seriously undermine the norms and rules of “open science”
53
  The latter implies 
that the scientific community – unlike the community of profit-seeking 
technologists that operate in firms – diffuse their discoveries through publications 
and the like.  The system of open science has for many years been an important 
determinant of the diffusion of knowledge in industry, and therefore ultimately of 
industrial growth. As the academic system turns to become far more secretive than 
in the past, this virtuous circle can be severely hampered.  In the US life sciences 
and biotechnology industry, the “privatisation” of knowledge has already become a 
serious issue.  
The desirable situation is probably an intermediate one between the US and 
European system. To identify the specific features of an institutional mechanism 
that would enjoy the advantages of both systems, while minimising their penalties, 
is an issue that is beyond the scope of this Report.  Our goal here is to point out that 
while the US system can have interesting implications for the growth of a 
technology-based industry, the European system is more likely to be able to 
preserve the norms of openness in scientific research which would then nurture the 
very same technology activities that can give rise to the growth of industries and 
firms.  Yet, we also note that while the US should take in serious consideration the 
contamination of academic norms, which can be produced by an excessive reliance 
on exclusive licensing agreements between universities and firms, Europe should 
care about the excessive ties, bureaucracy, and hierarchies of its scientific 
institutions, both at the national and the European levels. 
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VI.2 Financial Markets, Corporate Governance, and Labour Markets for Skilled 
Researchers and Managers. 
It is often mentioned that the take-off of biotechnology – and more generally – of
pharmaceuticals in the US, both through the large established corporations and the 
new biotechnology firms (NBFs), owes much to some specific institutions and 
attitudes that are typical of the American environment and much less developed in 
Europe. These factors have to do with the structure of financial markets, corporate 
governance, and labour markets for skilled researchers and managers. The 
development of venture capital, for example, rests critically on the nature of 
ownership and contract law typical of the US, which can be used to create 
sophisticated legal structures used to support risky new ventures.  
An important feature of the American institutional environment, which has 
favoured the development of NBFs and the fast restructuring of big pharmaceutical 
corporations, is the existence of an active labour market for scientists, technicians, 
and managerial experts within biotechnology. For example one firm fails or 
decided to shed competencies in one area, employees must be able to obtain similar 
employment without severe loss of salary or status.  Top executives at start-up 
firms typically come from large pharmaceutical companies or University research 
laboratories. These often senior scientists/managers would hesitate in making the 
move to a start-up if the career risk of doing so were large.   
Furthermore, innovation is dependent on the flow of knowledge between 
University labs, start-up research firms, and large pharmaceutical firms. While 
joint research projects, strategic alliances, and so forth, facilitate this exchange of 
knowledge, these “network externalities” are also supported by the rapid 
movement of scientists and technicians across firms. Thus, if the labour market did 
not support extensive lateral career mobility across firms, these network 
externalities would be difficult to sustain.    
In Europe, the organisation of labour and company law, combined with the 
organisational strategies of most large companies, constrains the development of 
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US-style active labour markets, and make it harder for companies to “hire and fire” 
personnel or rapidly cut non-performing assets.  
Moreover, though there is often some lateral movement across firms very early in a 
person’s career, the vast majority of European employees build their own careers 
within one firm. Correspondingly, the structure of decision-making, remuneration, 
and career-paths within firms differ fundamentally from common practice within 
the United States or United Kingdom. Career paths tend to be well specified, 
incremental, and based on rank hierarchies.   
This structure of large company organisation works quite well in industries 
dependent on long-term investment strategies in relatively stable technologies, 
characterised by the diffusion of deep skills throughout the firm. In particular, it 
encourages the creation of tacit organisational knowledge throughout the firm that 
enhances flexibility. However, this system creates fundamental obstacles to the 
creation of high-risk technology start-up firms. The risk of a «jumping ship» from 
an established large company (or – though there is less research in this area – a
prestigious University professorship) to a start-up firm is extremely high
54
   
More generally, successful research in high-technology firms requires the 
recruitment of scientists with highly specialised knowledge
55
.  
In the US, this problem is partially dealt with through a market-based system of 
financial institutions and through very strong financial incentives, typically stocks 
options. In Europe, this area is undergoing extensive change during the late 1990s, 
but during the 1980s the organisation of the European financial markets and 
property rights law made stock-based financial systems difficult to implement.  
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It is commonly believed that lack of venture capital has restricted the start-up 
activity of biotechnology firms in Europe. There is little question that venture 
capital played a key in role in facilitating the creation of NBFs and of a market for 
technology in the USA. 
There are important institutional reasons why the venture capital market is so large 
in the US.  First, very substantial private legal competencies exist and, due to the 
«enabling» nature of ownership and contract law, sophisticated legal structures can 
be used to support risky new ventures. These include the high-powered 
performance incentives for managers and scientists discussed above.  Second, and 
probably most important, in the United States the owners ip of firms is primarily 
financial in structure, and rooted in large capital markets (e.g. NASDAQ, NYSE). 
Conversely, in many European countries, the lack of developed capital markets for 
technology firms create important barriers for prospective venture capitalists.  
The forms of corporate governance and the structure of labour and financial 
markets are therefore likely to have hindered the process of adaptation of the 
European industry to the technological and institutional shocks. However, direct 
empirical evidence on these issues is not massive. Moreover, the relevance of these 
factors might turn out to be somewhat exaggerated. In fact, the observed difference 
in performance among some European countries may have more to do with 
differences in institutional settings, drug price regulation mechanisms, the nature of 
the scientific system, and the like. This suggests that differences in the nature of 
corporate governance and in the structure of labour and financial markets may have 
been important but not decisive factors in shaping the patterns of adaptation. 
Similarly, as far as venture capital is concerned, there appear to have been in 
Europe many other sources of funds (usually through government programs) 
available to prospective start-ups. In addition, although venture capital played a 
critical role in the founding of US biotechnology firms, collaborations between the 
new firms and the larger established corporations provided a potentially even more 
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important source of capital. This raises the quetion: could prospective European 
start-ups turn to established pharmaceutical firms as a source of capital?  
As noted earlier, European large corporations have collaborated relatively more 
with US biotechnology firms. Even in the absence of other institutional barr ers to 
entrepreneurial ventures, start-ups in Europe might have been crowded out by the 
large number of US based firms anxious to trade non-US marketing rights for 
capital. Given the number of US NBFs in search of capital, European firms 
interested in commercialising biotechnology had little incentive to invest in local 
biotechnology firms. 
As a partial support to this interpretation, in several European countries various 
initiatives by both domestic and foreign investors to launch venture capital fu ds 
were attempted in the Nineties, with mixed success so far and often ending up 
investing in new foreign biotechnology companies. Conversely, foreign venture 
capital firms have funded some of the few experiences of successful European 
NBFs. 
All in all, the slow development of venture capital in Europe seems to depend less 
on the lack of investors and funds than on the paucity of supply of promising start-
ups based on solid scientific research. 
VI.3 Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
It is widely acknowledged that patents are a fundamental incentive to innovative 
activities in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
56
.  
Both the U.S and the majority of the European countries have provided relatively 
strong patent protection in pharmaceuticals. In contra t, in Japan and in Italy, until 
(respectively) 1976 and 1978, patent law did not offer protection for 
pharmaceutical products: only process technologies could be patented. As a result, 
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Japanese and Italian (as well as Spanish) firms have tended to avoid pro uct R&D 
and to concentrate instead on finding novel processes for making existing 
molecules.  
Similarly, the establishment of clearly defined property rights also played a major 
role in making possible the explosion of new biotechnology firms in the USA, 
since the new firms had few complementary assets that would have enabled them 
to appropriate returns from the new science in the absence of strong patent rights. 
In the USA, a tight appropriability regime in the biotechnology industry emerged 
quite quickly, for example through the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 and through the 
granting of very broad claims on patents
57
. In Europe, the scope for broad claims 
on patents is greatly reduced and usually process rather than product patents are 
granted.  
A draft directive from the Commission that strengthens the protection offered to 
biotechnology was recently approved by the European Parliament. Still, 
considerable controversy surrounds this issue. It is indeed worth stressing that too 
strong an appropriability regime may not be unambiguously beneficial, especially 
as it concerns publicly funded research. Increasingly, in the USA doubts are voiced 
by economists, lawyers and industry analysts that the diffusion of an excessively 
permissive attitude towards the granting of broad claims on patents might actually 
slow down the process of diffusion and circulation of knowledge and hence the 
future rate of technological advance. However, it is also important to notice that the 
rationale for stronger protection to intellectual property in biomedical research is 
not based, according to this Report, on the traditional argument that the concession 
of broad property rights is an incentive to the production of knowledge. Rather, the 
argument is based on the assumption that property rights would favour the creation 
of markets for technology and hence a faster and more ordered diffusion and use of 
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knowledge
58
. This argument is however controversial and complex, and cannot be 
simply accepted at face value in general. Particularly, as we noted earli r, the 
increasing privatization of scientific knowledge is a problem of the US research 
system
59
. 
VI.4 Degrees and Forms of Competition on the Final Market 
Since regulation and public intervention in pharmaceuticals pursue multiple goals, 
which relate to both health and industrial policy, the history of the market 
regulatory regimes is characterized by a set of highly differentiated trajectories and 
patterns.  
Before the “managed care” revolution, in the US pharmaceutical companies’ 
returns from product innovation were protected by the low bargaining power of 
buyers. Moreover, unlike most European countries (with the exception of Germany 
and the Netherlands) and Japan, drug prices in the US have been unregulated by 
government intervention.  
Until the mid-1980s the overwhelming majority of drugs were marketed directly to 
physicians, who largely made the key purchasing decisions by deciding which drug 
to prescribe. Both the payers and the ultimate customers – patients – had little 
bargaining power, even in those instances where multiple drugs were available for 
the same condition. Because insurance companies generally did not cover 
prescription drugs (in 1960, only 4% of prescription drug expenditures were funded 
by third-party payers), they did not provide a major source of pricing leverage. 
Pharmaceutical companies were afforded a relatively high degree of pricing 
flexibility. This pricing flexibility, in turn, contributed to the profitability of 
investments in drug R&D.   
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When the rising costs of prescription drugs benefits have driven employers, 
insurers, and managed care plans to adopt new measures of cost containment
60
, a
differentiated set of techniques has been developed by the new buyers groups 
(HMOs, PBMs, insurance companies), which relies extensively on private funds 
and market-based techniques, allowing processes of corporate adaptation and 
restructuring in marketing and distribution channels and, moreover, stimulating 
competition and, indirectly, incentivating innovation.  
Historically, drug prices were also relatively high in other countries that did not 
have strong government intervention in prices, such as Germany and the 
Netherlands. In the UK, price regulation was framed as voluntary co-operation
between the pharmaceutical industry and the Ministry of Health, under the 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS). This scheme left companies to 
set their own prices, but a global profit margin with each firm was negotiated, 
which was designed to assure each of them an appropriate rate of return on capital 
investment including research, in the UK. The allowed rate of rate return was 
negotiated directly and was set higher for export oriented firms. In general, this 
scheme tended to favour both British and foreign R&D intensive companies, which 
operated directly in the UK. Conversely, it tended to penalise weak, imitative firms 
as well as those foreign competitors (primarily, the Germans) trying to enter the 
British market without direct innovative effort in loco
61
. In Japan, the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare used to set the prices of all drugs, using suggestions from the 
manufacturer based on the drug's efficacy and the prices of comparable products. 
Once fixed, however, the price was not been allowed to change over the life of the 
drug
62
. Thus, whereas in many competitive contexts prices began to fall as a 
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product matured, for a long time this was not the case in Japan. Given that 
manufacturing costs often fall with cumulative experience, old drugs thus probably 
offered the highest profit margins to many Japanese companies, further curtailing 
the incentive to introduce innovative drugs.   
The procedures for the approval of drugs have also played an important role. For 
example, there is now widespread recognition that the introduction of the 
Kefauver- Harris Amendments in 1962 in the USA had a significant impact in 
inducing a deep transformation of the US pharmaceutical industry, particularly 
through raising the cost and complexity of R&D. Partly as a result many US firms 
were forced to upgrade their sci ntific capability. The adoption of tight scientific 
procedures in clinical trials might also have pushed to develop earlier and stronger 
relationships with the new emerging biomedical community. Similarly, Britain 
appears to have actively encouraged a "harsher" competitive environment. Since 
the early 1960s, the British system encouraged the entry of highly skilled foreign 
pharmaceutical firms and a stringent regulatory environment also facilitated a more 
rapid trend towards the adoption by British companies of institutional practices 
typical of the American and Swiss companies: in particular, product strategies 
based on high priced patented molecules, strong linkages with universities and 
aggressive marketing strategies focused on local doctors. The resulting c ange in 
the competitive environment in the home market induced British firms to pursue 
strategies aiming less to the fragmentation of innovative efforts into numerous 
minor products than to the concentration on few important products that could 
diffuse widely into the global market. By the 1970s, the ensuing transformations of 
British firms had led to their increasing expansion into the world markets
63
.  
Conversely, the less successful performance of other national pharmaceutical 
industries (like Italy and Japan) reflects much weaker competitive pressures in 
domestic markets. In these countries, the combination of patent laws, policies 
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surrounding licensing and comarketing agreements, and drug pricing and 
reimbursement regimes, produced a “soft” regulatory regime whereby firms had 
little incentive to develop world-class product development capabilities, and in 
general they concentrated on finding novel processes for making existing foreign 
or domestically-originated molecules. Moreover, in these countri s, firms were 
usually protected from foreign competition and simultaneously had strong 
incentives to license products that had been approved overseas. Under this regime 
the predominant technology strategy for pharmaceutical companies often became 
the identification of promising foreign products to license-in. 
On this, it is important to say that in the recent years, under the pression of 
increasing fiscal constraints, some European countries complemented their price 
fixing procedures with interventions on levels of reimbursement, delistings, price 
cuts. While, according to the available evidences, these measures have tended to 
realize, at best, short-term savings and, in any case, they have not affected rates of 
growth of expenditure on pharmaceuticals, these measures have introduced new 
distorsions in the final markets
64
.  
At the same time, in some European countries – albeit in different forms and speed 
–regulatory schemes have been changing towards an increasing reliance on market 
based mechanisms. This trend is importa. However, firms’ strategic orientations 
and organisational attitudes change slowly and tend to persist for long periods of 
time. Equally, the development of competencies and innovative capabilities  is a 
long, cumulative and difficult process that does not respond immediately and 
smoothly to economic incentives.  
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VII.  Conclusions 
VII.1. Summary of the main results and issues
The main results of this Report can be summarized as follows.  
a) In the 1990s the European industry has grown less than the US industry. 
This stems from a deceleration of the growth of the industry in Europe, and 
an acceleration of the US industry growth. The restructuring of 
pharmaceutical demand, and particularly of the health care system, in the 
US, seems to have translated in o demand growth, which has benefited 
mainly the US firms. Moreover, in the US (and Japan) the growth of the 
industry stems to a good extent from the growth of its non-labour i puts. 
By contrast, these inputs contribute modestly to the growth of the industry 
in Europe, whose growth is accounted for largely by the unexplained 
residuals – viz. by factors that are independent of the growth of the 
measurable inputs. Our analysis shows that, plausibly, the growth of the 
industry in Europe depends to a good extent on factors other than R&D, 
capital or labour.  Not only is this saying that the growth of the industry in 
Europe is more “erratic” than in the US or Japan, but also that the growth 
in capital or R&D translates less markedly into sales growth.  This is 
probably not independent of our earlier remarks about the larger presence 
in the European pharmaceutical sector of firms or activities which are less 
dependent on internal R&D and innovation, and more on external inputs 
such as licenses from international c mpanies, pricing policies or 
peculiarities of the public health care systems or demand in individual 
European countries, etc.  
b) These trends take place within a context of marked globalisation of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Protection on local markets di inishes and 
penetration from foreign companies increases in each domestic market. 
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The shares of US, British, French and Danish largest corporate groups 
increases in all regions, whereas Germany and Italy lose ground. Market 
shares of domestic corporations fall everywhere in domestic markets;  
c) Our data indicate that the sales of major innovative products by the US 
multinationals have increased more significantly than those of the 
European multinationals in the 1990s. Moreover, European big 
corporations seem to lag somewhat behind in their ability to produce and 
above all sell, new, innovative, best selling drugs. However, when we look 
at the number of the top selling new chemical entities (NCE) developed by 
the European and US firms, we find that the difference s not as big as the 
difference in sales. This might indicate that the European firms are facing a 
comparative disadvantage in selling their new drugs. All in all, the 
observed differences in sales growth between European and US largest 
multinationals during the Nineties do not seem to depend only on  
differences in the ability to develop new breakthrough drugs, but also on 
the observed difference in demand growth between the two areas.   
d) Data confirm that the 1990s have shown an acceleration of the 
competitiveness of the US pharmaceutical industry as a whole in the 
innovation-i tensive segment of the industry. First, the leading US firms 
have a higher share of turnover based on recent products compared to the 
European firms. Second, the US: i) have aigher share of patents in the 
new biotech fields compared to “classical” pharmaceuticals; ii) are a 
preferred destination of research by the European companies as well. This 
latter point is important. It suggests that the leading European companies 
may reinforce the US advantage in biotech, as they nurture US rather than 
European scientific base and biotech companies. This is an indication of 
the existence of path-dependent effects, or first-mover advantages – i.e. 
biotech started in the US, and this may produce persisting advantages over 
time. Not only the Swiss and UK companies have in their portfolios a high 
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share of biotech patents invented in the US, but French and, to some 
extent, German, companies license in biotech patents generated in the US 
as well.  
e) The competitive advantage of the US companies in innovation relies both 
on higher internal capabilities and on a higher reliance on collaboration, 
especially in the pre-clinical stages of research and development. However, 
the US companies have: i) higher probability of success during phases I, II, 
and III of the clinical trials when the new compounds have been developed 
in-house; ii) a higher share of licensed compounds. Moreover, we found 
that: iii) the probability of success does not differ among US and European 
companies when the compounds are licensed. This finding suggests that 
the US exhibit a more pronounced division of labour in the drug innovation 
process between large companies on the one hand and small 
biotech/specialised firms as well as scientific institutions on the other.  
f) The US advantage and the emergence of a process of deteriorating 
competitiveness in Europe have been emphasised and deepened by the 
advent of the molecular biology revolution. The competitiveness of the US 
system seems to be largely related to the extensive exploration of new 
technological opportunities. In fact, one notable difference between Europe 
and the US in the 1990s is that while the US have become the centre of 
world basic research in life sciences and have continued the development 
of a new research-intensive industry in this field, Europe has been unable 
to develop and attract research and to complete the process of vertical 
specialisation in the most innovative areas of the drug sector.  Particularly, 
Europe has not really given rise to a full fledged industry of innovation 
specialist companies and technology suppliers like in the US. In principle, 
the fact that Europe has been unable to give rise to a full fledged industry 
of technology suppliers is not a critic l problem for the competitiveness of 
the firms operating in the final drug markets. We argued earlier that 
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competitiveness in sales may depend on different factors from 
competitivenss in innovation.  Moreover, in a globalised industry such as 
this, companies may not need local technology suppliers, provided that the 
drug producers can tap the new technology sources in other markets. The 
question however is whether all the European drug companies can tap such 
international sources of technology.  In additio , this Report shows that the 
presence of a local industry of research-based firms and technology 
suppliers is critical because the industry is by itself a powerful source of 
growth.  Other factors appear to be linked to country-specific variables, 
primarily,: the level of funding of fundamental scientific research and the 
structure of the biomedical research systems; the degree and the forms of 
competition on the market for drugs. Furthermore, other institutional 
factors are likely to have played an important r le, even if here the 
evidence is less compelling: some basic institutions governing labour 
markets for skilled researchers and managers, company organisation and 
finance; the levels of patent protection; 
g)  The above findings are consistent with other featur s of the European 
environment, linked to the “institutional shock” created by cost-
containment policies in a context of fragmented institutions and rules. In 
particular, this Report shows that there is too little competition in some 
European countries and that this lack of competition tends to nurture 
inefficient positions within the industry. Price fixing mechanisms tend to 
protect local firms in domestic markets, allowing for the survival of infra-
marginal companies in some European countries. These are highly labour 
intensive companies. What is important is not that they specialise in 
marketing. This might not be too serious a problem, if companies could 
take advantage of an effective division of labour with innovators located 
elsewhere - and possibly in Europe. On the contrary, local, marketing-
specialised companies might even be able to exploit their specific 
knowledge of local markets as an important competitive asset. However, -
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absent the implicit protection afforded by price regulation mechanisms- the 
benefits of such division of labour can only be reaped through much higher 
efficiency than it is shown by the vast majority of these companies, as data 
on productivity demonstrate. Moreover, if the declining trend of the share 
of marketing agreemnts vis-à-vis research agreements persists over time, 
many European companies might be relegated into the fringe of the world 
industry. In any case, a deteriorating innovative performance is likely to 
imply lower growth, lower welfare, and lower independence of European 
countries.   
VII.2 Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals. An Interpretative 
Framework 
To begin with, it is important to recognise that over the past decade significant 
progresses have been made both within individual countries and at the European 
level towards the introduction of stronger competition, the strengthening and the 
re-organisation of the research base, the creation of capital markets, etc..  
Some large European corporations appear to have caught-up with their American 
competitors, also through strategies of external growth. In more recent years, an 
encouraging dynamism is observed in countries like Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, as the rate of creation of NBFs is concerned. 
These changes are not yet reflected in the data on competitiveness, but certainly 
represent a motive for optimism. 
Moreover, the decline in European competitiveness in pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology is not a homogeneous phenomenon, but it actually results from 
largely heterogeneous performances of individual firms and countries. To a 
considerable extent, the European problem derives from the deterioration of the 
German and Italian performance. Conversely, the cases of the UK, Denmark but 
also Sweden and Ireland, have to be considered as succ ss stories. 
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This consideration is even more important, as soon as it is recognised that behind 
these different cases, there are extremely varied motivations and policies. For 
example, there is no doubt that the successes of France and Ireland derive from 
radically different approaches. Moreover, recent developments in German 
biotechnology would suggest that local institutional frameworks can be 
successfully modified and adapted to the requirements of the technological 
regimes, without changing their fundamental character.  
Thus, a definite and too detailed policy prescription fitting all European countries 
might be misleading. However, the results of this report suggest some broad, but 
clear, policy implications:  
A. Upgrading basic scientific research 
First, to the extent that the decline of European competitiveness is linked to a 
deteriorating innovative performance, especially in the new, leading edge 
technologies, efforts should be primarily devoted to the strengthening of innovative 
capabilities. In turn, this implies a fundamental upgrading of basic scientific 
research. 
The crucial importance of the availability of a strong research base can hardly be 
underrated, in that it is the basic pre-condition for strong technological 
competencies, industrial dynamism, and also for the efficacy of other policy 
initiatives aiming at inducing institutional and cultural changes. While it might be 
true that the European performance in science is comparatively better than the 
technological and industrial performance, still the gap with the USA is very large. 
Moreover, whilst the American research system (including Canada) is an integrated 
system, highly differentiated and pluralistic within a common framework, 
European science is composed of fragmented and relatively sma l national systems. 
Indeed, European research teams tend to collaborate comparatively more with US 
groups and there is little question that North America constitutes the main attractor 
of human and financial resources from all over the world, including Europe. Since 
the dynamics (and the economics and sociology) of scientific research is 
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characterised by strong path-dependent effects and first-mover advantages, success 
breeds further success and divergence tends to increase rather than decrease. 
Strengthening the research base implies not only increased funding, but also 
introducing important changes in the organisation of research systems: for example 
and primarily: 
· Realise a closer integration between teaching and research in biomedical 
sciences; 
· Promote an integrated environment, in which a set of differentiated sources 
of funding, which act according to alternative allocative mechanisms and 
principles, and compete for supporting absolute scientific excellence; 
· Realise the constitution – these principles – of an integrated European – 
as opposed to a collection of small national or even sub-national – research 
system. 
B.   Favouring the integration between scientific and industrial research 
The results of the report show also that Europe has been facing s vere difficulties 
in exploiting scientific research for industrial purposes. On the the one side, this 
and other complementary analyses
65
 rev al that the American pharmaceutical 
industry was able to gain extraordinary benefits from its research base, because of 
the fluid nature of the boundary between public and private institutions in the field. 
As mentioned previously, the relative European weakness in pharmaceuticals, 
biotechnology, and biomedical sciences is likely to depend, primarily – on the 
smaller scale, the lower quality and the organisation of scientific research itself. 
These considerations notwithstanding, measures can be taken to improve the 
interaction between industry and basic research, both at the level of large 
corporations and through the creation of new science-based firms. As previously 
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mentioned in the report, this has been indeed the main focus of several policy 
actions taken by governments and local authority throughout Europe. However, 
these policies have mainly aimed at building bridges between University and 
industry and to developing financial and infrastructural facilities like venture 
capital, science parks, etc. In practice, these measures – important as they are – 
appear to reflect a conceptualisation of the innovativ process based on some 
version of the so-called linear model and – as a consequence – to emphasise the 
aspect of the transfer of knowledge. Recognising the interactive nature of the 
processes of innovation in biomedical and pharmaceutical research
66
, more 
emphasis should be given instead to the problem of a more direct integration of 
different agents and fragments of knowledge. Thus, measures should be taken to 
favour the development of more direct linkages between universities and industry, 
through the integration of research and teaching and the development of markets 
for technology. 
C. Strengthening industrial R&D 
Firms remain the main locus and engine of industrial innovation. Thus, 
strengthening their technological capabilities appears as a crucial priority for 
European competitiveness. The results of this report indicate that rather than an 
insufficient investment in R&D, European companies lag behind their American 
counterparts primarily in terms of their capabilities to organise research according 
to the principles dictated by the new technological regime. Moreover,  the 
persistence of a large fringe of non-innovative companies, which survive in 
domestic markets through marketing based strategies and through implicit 
protection, still characterises many European countries.  
Thus, European firms should improve their in – ouse research capabilities, also 
using in a much more systematic and efficient ways networks of collaborative 
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relations with universities and NBFs and the market for technology. A major result
of the report is that division of labour could help in reducing the competitive 
differences due to different in-house capabilities. In other words, a division of 
innovative labour would enable drug companies which are behind the leading US 
ones in organisational capabilities, and innovation, to catch up. Similarly, the 
markets for technology and division of labour can support firms specialised in 
marketing, provided they are able to improve their efficiency. However, leadership 
in modern pharmaceutical R&D requires the development of adequate integrative 
capabilities, i.e. of competencies in co-ordinating decentralised research activities 
and in identifying and exploiting complementarities and economies of scope. 
D. Strengthening market-based competition within an integrated environment 
Besides the already mentioned problems related to insufficient connections with 
science, excessive diversification and delays in adopting the new organisational 
principles of pharmaceutical R&S, other factors contribute to explain why fewer 
European corporations have adapted successfully to the molecular biology 
revolution and why such process is taking place more slowly than in the USA. 
These factors have to do with the general principles of organisation of corporate 
governance, financial markets, markets for skilled labour.  
More specifically, this Report shows that the decline of European competitiveness 
in pharmaceuticals is linked to the persistence of a fragmented market and, at the 
same time, to major “non-market” and bureaucratic failures in public intervention 
and price regulation attempting  
In this respect, strengthening competition at the European level constitutes a 
fundamental pre-requisite for inducing more innovation-oriented strategies and 
higher efficiency of less innovative firms. On the one hand, strong levels of patent 
protection for the segment of the in-pat nt products should be guaranteed and 
enforced. On the other hand, National Health Authorities, should converge on a 
higher reliance on innovative management methods and on competitive 
mechanisms, moving away from schemes excessively based on administrative 
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decisions and bureaucratic structures/rules in the regulation of the market. The off 
patent segment of the market and the distribution system could constitute two 
important test-beds for such a deregulation pattern for pharmaceuticals.  
Two general principles could help the achievement of a higher level of integration 
of the market. First, a higher variety of schemes and sources for the financing of
healthcare and pharmaceuticals could be promoted in all European Countries. 
Second, Governments could fix reasonable levels of patients’ copayment
67
 thr ugh 
the introduction of schemes analogous to incentive-based, open formularies, so that 
competition onthe final market can be stimulated in ways that fully preserve equity 
and, moreover, national health policy goals and solutions
68
. 
At the end of this Section, it is important to notice that the movement towards a 
regulatory environment based on an integrated s t of market-based mechanisms 
will become even more crucial with the accession of Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs). In principle, the Enlargement to CEECs can contribute 
significantly to the competitiveness of the European Industry. In order for this goal 
to be realised, however, an integrated regulatory and competitive environment has 
to be quickly designed and implemented. In particular, in the absence of a higher 
reliance on market-based competitive mechanisms, the Enlargement could very 
easily lead to amplify the existing distortions. This is particularly true given the 
financial pressure that the new Member States will experience and the tensions that 
would necessarily emerge between cost containment issues and the principle of a 
free movement of goods
69
.  
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